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Abstract
In the age of artificial intelligence, highly sophisticated algorithms
have been deployed to provide analysis, detect patterns, optimize
solutions, accelerate operations, facilitate self-learning, minimize human
errors and biases, and foster improvements in technological products and
services. Notwithstanding these tremendous benefits, algorithms and
intelligent machines do not provide equal benefits to all. Just as the
“digital divide” has separated those with access to the Internet,
information technology, and digital content from those without, an
emerging and ever-widening “algorithmic divide” now threatens to take
away the many political, social, economic, cultural, educational, and
career opportunities provided by machine learning and artificial
intelligence. Although policy makers, commentators, and the mass media
have paid growing attention to algorithmic bias and the shortcomings of
machine learning and artificial intelligence, the algorithmic divide has yet
to attract much policy and scholarly attention. To fill the lacuna, this
Article draws on the digital divide literature to systematically analyze this
new inequitable gap between the technology haves and have-nots.
Utilizing an analytical framework that the Author developed in the early
2000s, the Article discusses the five attributes of the algorithmic divide:
awareness, access, affordability, availability, and adaptability. This
Article then turns to three major problems precipitated by an emerging
and fast-expanding algorithmic divide: algorithmic deprivation,
algorithmic discrimination, and algorithmic distortion. This Article
concludes by proposing seven non-exhaustive clusters of remedial
actions to help bridge this emerging and ever-widening divide.
Combining law, communications policy, ethical principles, institutional
mechanisms, and business practices, the Article fashions a holistic
response to foster equality in the age of artificial intelligence.
* Copyright © 2020 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and
Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions of
this Article were presented at the Inaugural HKU Technology Law Symposium organized by the
Law and Technology Centre in the Faculty of Law at the University of Hong Kong, the
International Law Weekend 2019 at Fordham University School of Law, the Third Annual IP
Leaders Roundtable at UIC John Marshall Law School in Chicago, a presentation for the
Intellectual Property Student Association at Florida International University College of Law, the
Third Annual Scholarship Retreat at Texas A&M University School of Law, and the Faculty
Workshop at the University of Kansas School of Law. I am grateful to Anne Cheung, Daryl Lim,
Lumen Mulligan, Janewa Osei-Tutu, Uma Outka, and Sun Haochen for their kind invitations and
the event participants for their valuable comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
In the age of artificial intelligence (AI), highly sophisticated
algorithms1 have been deployed to provide analysis, detect patterns,
optimize solutions, accelerate operations, facilitate self-learning,
minimize human errors and biases, and foster improvements in
1. As the U.S. Public Policy Council of the Association for Computing Machinery
explained:
An algorithm is a self-contained step-by-step set of operations that
computers and other “smart” devices carry out to perform calculation, data
processing, and automated reasoning tasks. Increasingly, algorithms implement
institutional decision-making based on analytics, which involves the discovery,
interpretation, and communication of meaningful patterns in data. Especially
valuable in areas rich with recorded information, analytics relies on the
simultaneous application of statistics, computer programming, and operations
research to quantify performance.
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACH. U.S. PUB. POLICY COUNCIL, STATEMENT ON ALGORITHMIC
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2017) [hereinafter ACM STATEMENT], https://www.acm
.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/2017_usacm_statement_algorithms.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8DK3-ZHMY].

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4

2

Yu and Yu: The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial Inte

2020]

THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

333

technological products and services.2 As Pedro Domingos observed in the
opening of his best-selling book, The Master Algorithm:
You may not know it, but machine learning is all around
you. When you type a query into a search engine, it’s how
the engine figures out which results to show you (and which
ads, as well). When you read your e-mail, you don’t see most
of the spam, because machine learning filtered it out. Go to
Amazon.com to buy a book or Netflix to watch a video, and
a machine-learning system helpfully recommends some you
might like. Facebook uses machine learning to decide which
updates to show you, and Twitter does the same for tweets.
Whenever you use a computer, chances are machine learning
is involved somewhere.3
Indeed, without the enhancements that algorithms provide, machines will
not be able to acquire the “intelligence” needed to effectively function in
today’s fast-evolving technological environment.4
Despite the tremendous promise of machine learning and artificial
intelligence, algorithms and intelligent machines do not provide equal
2. See id. (“Computer algorithms are [now] widely employed throughout our economy
and society to make decisions that have far-reaching impacts, including their applications for
education, access to credit, healthcare, and employment.”); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 9 (2017) (“Digital
tracking and decision-making systems have become routine in policing, political forecasting,
marketing, credit reporting, criminal sentencing, business management, finance, and the
administration of public programs.”); NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN 3 (2016), https://www.nitrd.
gov/pubs/national_ai_rd_strategic_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N4S -VHW4] (“Artificial
intelligence . . . is a transformative technology that holds promise for tremendous societal and
economic benefit. AI has the potential to revolutionize how we live, work, learn, discover, and
communicate.”); Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66
UCLA L. REV. 54, 56 (2019) (“Today, algorithms determine the optimal way to produce and ship
goods, the prices we pay for those goods, the money we can borrow, the people who teach our
children, and the books and articles we read—reducing each activity to an actuarial risk or
score.”). See generally Tarleton Gillespie, The Relevance of Algorithms, in MEDIA
TECHNOLOGIES: ESSAYS ON COMMUNICATION, MATERIALITY, AND SOCIETY 167 (Tarleton
Gillespie et al. eds., 2014) (providing an excellent discussion of the role of algorithms in
producing and certifying publicly relevant information). For discussions of the transformation
provided by the deployment of algorithms, see generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER
ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD
(2015); CHRISTOPHER STEINER, AUTOMATE THIS: HOW ALGORITHMS CAME TO RULE OUR WORLD
(2012).
3. DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at xi.
4. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1149 (2017) (“Many products and
services, including email spam filters, medical diagnoses, product marketing, and self-driving
cars, . . . depend on machine-learning algorithms and their ability to deliver astonishing
forecasting power and speed.” (footnotes omitted)).
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benefits to all5—or, for that matter, all countries across the world.6 Just
as the “digital divide” has separated those with access to the Internet,
information technology, and digital content from those without,7 an
emerging and ever-widening “algorithmic divide” now prevents a large
segment of the population—in both developed and developing
countries—from enjoying access to machine learning and artificial
intelligence. Without such access, those who are on the unfortunate side
of the divide will miss out on the many political, social, economic,
cultural, educational, and career opportunities provided by machine
learning and artificial intelligence. Even worse, the lack of access to these
technologies will trigger a vicious cycle in which the technology rich will
get richer and the gap between the have and have-nots will widen even
further.8
Although policy makers, commentators, and the mass media have
paid growing attention to algorithmic bias9 and the shortcomings of
machine learning and artificial intelligence, the algorithmic divide has yet
5. See discussion infra Section II.A (discussing algorithmic deprivation).
6. As the International Telecommunication Union noted in an issue paper:
According to the simulation, economies with higher readiness to benefit from AI
may achieve absorption levels about 11 percentage points higher than those of
slow adopters by 2023, and this gap looks set to widen to about 23 percentage
points by 2030. This indicates that like the digital divide, an AI divide may
emerge between advanced and developing economies.
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 32
(2018); see also GREGG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 40–41 (2017) (discussing how “[a] country with a significant advantage in AI-based
intelligence analysis achieves decisive strategic advantage decision-making and shaping”);
JACQUES BUGHIN ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., NOTES FROM THE AI FRONTIER MODELING THE
IMPACT OF AI ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (2018) (“Those that establish themselves as AI leaders
(mostly developed economies) could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in economic benefits
compared with today, while emerging economies may capture only half their upside.”); LEE KAIFU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 169 (2018)
(expressing concern about the fast-growing “divide between the AI haves and have-nots”);
William J. Magnuson, Artificial Financial Intelligence, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 24), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403712 [https://perma.cc/26R9-NVE4] (noting the
worry about the benefits that artificial intelligence has provided to “actors that have the scientific
know-how, research budgets, and access to information that are necessary to develop artificial
intelligence systems”).
7. See generally Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information
Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the digital divide).
8. See Ralph Hamann, Developing Countries Need to Wake Up to the Risks of New
Technologies, CONVERSATION (Jan. 4, 2018, 2:06 AM), https://theconversation.com/developingcountries-need-to-wake-up-to-the-risks-of-new-technologies-87213 [https://perma.cc/YE9HDPFD] (“Elites within these countries will be more likely to make use of AI and other new
technologies. This will further increase returns to capital widening the gap between elites’
productive capacity and that of everyone else.”).
9. See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing algorithmic biases).
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to attract much policy and scholarly attention.10 To fill this lacuna, Part I
draws on the digital divide literature to systematically analyze this new
inequitable gap between the technology haves and have-nots. Utilizing
an analytical framework that the Author developed in the early 2000s,11
this Part discusses the five attributes of the algorithmic divide: (1)
awareness; (2) access; (3) affordability; (4) availability; and (5)
adaptability.
Part II turns to three major problems precipitated by an emerging and
fast-expanding algorithmic divide: (1) algorithmic deprivation; (2)
algorithmic discrimination; and (3) algorithmic distortion. While the first
two problems affect primarily those on the unfortunate side of the divide,
the last problem impacts individuals on both sides. Taken together, all of
these problems show that the algorithmic divide has posed challenges not
only to the poor, the disadvantaged, and the vulnerable, but to virtually
everybody in what Jack Balkin has called an “Algorithmic Society.”12
10. Most of the discussions in this area are found in popular media. See, e.g., Jacques
Bughin & James Manyika, Technology Convergence and AI Divides: A Simulation Appraisal,
VOX (Sept. 7, 2018), https://voxeu.org/article/technology-convergence-and-ai-divides [https://
perma.cc/5RN6-42WC] (discussing three levels of the artificial intelligence divide: “individuals
(workers), companies, and countries” (emphasis omitted)); Cosette Jarrett, AI Could Be Driving
a New Digital Divide, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 5, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/
10/05/ai-could-be-driving-a-new-digital-divide/ [https://perma.cc/TLR2-RVCV] (discussing the
corporate artificial intelligence divide); Vyacheslav Polonski, AI Trust and AI Fears: A Media
Debate That Could Divide Society, MEDIUM (Jan. 9, 2018), https://medium.com/@drpolonski/aitrust-and-ai-fears-a-media-debate-that-could-divide-society-52e16a74c979 [https://perma.cc/
L3Y9-R3CE] (discussing the divide between those who trust artificial intelligence and those who
do not); Anjana Susarla, The New Digital Divide Is Between People Who Opt Out of Algorithms
and People Who Don’t, CONVERSATION (Apr. 17, 2019, 6:54 AM), https://theconversation.com/
the-new-digital-divide-is-between-people-who-opt-out-of-algorithms-and-people-who-dont-114
719 [https://perma.cc/PH84-V2BP] (discussing the digital divide between those who opt out of
algorithms and those who do not). A rare exception is a white paper released by the International
Development Research Centre:
This AI divide transcends geographic, socio-economic, gender, and race
boundaries. The infrastructure required for the development of AI applications
restricts this activity, for the most part, to locales with sufficient computing
power, access to (or resources to collect) relevant data, and the requisite AI skills.
The geography of the participation gap is perhaps best illustrated by the relative
dominance of a few countries (and a few large tech companies) in the
development of AI.
MATTHEW L. SMITH & SUJAYA NEUPANE, INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD A RESEARCH AGENDA 58 (2018), https://www.idrc.ca/
sites/default/files/ai_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB96-R6V5].
11. See Yu, supra note 7, at 8–16 (providing the framework).
12. Jack M. Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy:
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017) (defining
“Algorithmic Society” as “a society organized around social and economic decision-making by
AND
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Part III proposes seven non-exhaustive clusters of remedial actions to
help bridge this emerging and ever-widening divide. To fashion a holistic
response to address the three problems identified earlier and taking note
of the “multidimensional phenomenon” generated by the algorithmic
divide,13 this Part outlines solutions that combine law, communications
policy, ethical principles, institutional mechanisms, and business
practices.14 While it will not be easy to bridge this divide, these solutions
strive to ensure greater access to machine learning and artificial
intelligence and, in turn, equality in the age of artificial intelligence.
I. ATTRIBUTES
Although the algorithmic divide has not yet garnered much policy and
scholarly attention, those commentators who have studied this divide
have remarked on the strong resemblance between this new inequitable
gap and the earlier digital divide.15 The latter began attracting
considerable interest and attention two and a half decades ago.16 From the
mid-1990s to the early 2000s, the Clinton Administration released four

algorithms, robots, and AI agents, who not only make the decisions but also, in some cases, carry
them out”). Aneesh Aneesh would go further to describe an algorithm-pervasive society as an
“algocracy.” A. ANEESH, VIRTUAL MIGRATION: THE PROGRAMMING OF GLOBALIZATION 5 (2006)
(defining “algocracy” as the “rule of the algorithm[] or [the] rule of the code” and noting that such
governance structure is “the key difference between the current and previous rounds of global
integration”). See generally Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 4 (discussing whether the use of
machine-learning algorithms, robotic decision tools, and artificial intelligence by government
agencies can pass muster under core administrative and constitutional law doctrines).
13. Cf. PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND
THE INTERNET WORLDWIDE 4 (2001) (calling for “the concept of the digital divide [to be]
understood as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing three distinct aspects”—namely the
“global divide,” the “social divide,” and the “democratic divide”); JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE
DEEPENING DIVIDE: INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 3 (2005) (conceiving of the digital
divide “as a social and political problem, not a technological one”).
14. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, ETHICALLY ALIGNED DESIGN: A VISION FOR
PRIORITIZING HUMAN WELL-BEING WITH AUTONOMOUS AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 58 (2017),
https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/ead_v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/389L-CKSW] (noting the need for “meaningful interdisciplinary collaboration”
between engineers and designers of autonomous and intelligent systems, on the one hand, and
“ethicists, legal scholars, and social scientists, both in academia and industry,” on the other).
15. See sources cited supra note 10 (collecting sources that refer to the algorithmic or
artificial intelligence divide as the “new digital divide”).
16. See VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 1 (“At the end of the 1990s, the issue of the so-called
digital divide was suddenly put on the agenda of public, political, and scholarly debate, starting
in the United States and spreading to Europe and the rest of the world.”); JAN VAN DIJK, THE
DIGITAL DIVIDE 1 (2020) (“In the year 2020 both the concept of and the research into the digital
divide will be twenty-five years old. In 1995 the term ‘digital divide’ was first used in a number
of newspapers in the United States.”).
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detailed surveys in a series entitled Falling Through the Net.17 Since then,
book-length treatments of the digital divide have been published.18 Two
U.S. law reviews have also organized symposia to explore the topic.19
While issues relating to the digital divide no longer attract as much
attention as they used to, they remain relevant in the public policy debate
and come back from time to time, especially around presidential
elections.20
In the past few years, commentators have begun to pay greater
attention to the algorithmic or artificial intelligence divide.21 Some
commentators have recently referred to this divide as the “new digital
divide,” noting the parallels between this inequitable gap and the earlier
17. In chronological order, these four surveys were as follows: NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: A SURVEY OF THE “HAVE NOTS”
IN RURAL AND URBAN AMERICA (1995), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED399126.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2HXV-KE2S]; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
FALLING THROUGH THE NET II: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1998), https://www.ntia.
doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/falling-through-net-ii.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3MK-X8LQ];
NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET:
DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1999), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/fttn99/
FTTN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZGE-YMEE]; NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: TOWARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (2000) [hereinafter
FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV], https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fttn00.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y622-JUZY]. Upon the arrival of the George W. Bush Administration, the
digital divide was no longer a key governmental concern. Instead of Falling Through the Net, the
survey became A Nation Online. See NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF THE INTERNET
(2002); see also Yu, supra note 7, at 33–35 (noting the comparison made by Federal
Communications Commission Chairman Michael Powell of the digital divide to the “Mercedes
Divide”).
18. See, e.g., RANETA LAWSON MACK, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: STANDING AT THE
INTERSECTION OF RACE & TECHNOLOGY (2001); NORRIS, supra note 13; ANNE PEACOCK, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2019); MASSIMO RAGNEDDA, THE THIRD DIGITAL DIVIDE: A
WEBERIAN APPROACH TO DIGITAL INEQUALITIES (2017); THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FACING A CRISIS OR
CREATING A MYTH? (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2001); THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: THE INTERNET AND
SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Massimo Ragnedda & Glenn W. Muschert
eds., 2013); THEORIZING DIGITAL DIVIDES (Massimo Ragnedda & Glenn W. Muschert eds., 2018);
VAN DIJK, supra note 13; VAN DIJK, supra note 16; MARK WARSCHAUER, TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIAL INCLUSION: RETHINKING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (2003).
19. Symposium, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2002); Symposium, Digital Divide, Digital Opportunities, 24
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 449 (2002).
20. See, e.g., John Hendel, Democrats Torch Trump Failures on Rural Digital Divide,
POLITICO (Aug. 17, 2019, 6:37 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/17/rural-digitaldivide-democratic-candidates-1655290 [https://perma.cc/Z32S-YDMJ] (“Several presidential
candidates including Joe Biden, Elizabeth Warren and Pete Buttigieg have rolled out proposals
for tens of billions in new federal dollars to bring fast broadband service to rural America, with
Warren’s $85 billion plan leading the spending pack.”).
21. See sources cited supra note 10 (collecting sources that discuss the algorithmic or
artificial intelligence divide).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4

338

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

digital divide.22 Given the similarities, this Part draws on prior research
in the digital divide literature to explore ways to systematically analyze
the new algorithmic divide. Specifically, this Part utilizes the analytical
framework that this Author developed in the early 2000s to examine the
five attributes of the algorithmic divide: (1) awareness; (2) access; (3)
affordability; (4) availability; and (5) adaptability.23
A. Awareness
While those on the unfortunate side of the digital divide can easily
notice their being left out of the Internet revolution,24 especially after the
medium entered the mainstream in the mid-1990s, those on the
unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide may have greater difficulty
discovering their exclusion from machine learning and artificial
intelligence.25 Indeed, many individuals on this unfortunate side may not
appreciate how the increased use of machine-learning algorithms and
intelligent machines can impact their lives—both positively and
negatively. Even among those who take note of these impacts, most will
have a very limited understanding of how algorithms actually operate.26
In this age of artificial intelligence, individuals—in both developed
and developing countries—will need to become more aware of the
strengths and drawbacks of algorithm-enhanced technological products
and services. While such enhancement enables individuals to do things
that they otherwise could not accomplish with traditional computing
technology, these new technologies could also backfire when biased
22. See, e.g., LEE RAINIE & JANNA ANDERSON, CODE-DEPENDENT: PROS AND CONS OF THE
ALGORITHM AGE 13 (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/
9/2017/02/PI_2017.02.08_Algorithms_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8KA-CU6X] (linking to
the digital divide the new divide between those “whose capabilities and perception of the world
is augmented by sensors and processed with powerful AI and connected to vast amounts of data”
and “those who don’t have access to those tools or knowledge of how to utilize them” (quoting
Ryan Hayes, Owner, Fit to Tweet)); Jarrett, supra note 10 (“There may be a new digital divide
forming . . . . As artificial intelligence continues to grow and become more commonplace, some
experts fear there may be significant disadvantages for companies—and their employees—who
don’t have access to AI resources.”); Susarla, supra note 10 (noting in the title that “[t]he new
digital divide is between people who opt out of algorithms and people who don’t”).
23. See Yu, supra note 7, at 8–16 (discussing these attributes). This typology has been used
or endorsed by other scholars in the digital divide literature. See, e.g., ROLF H. WEBER, SHAPING
INTERNET GOVERNANCE: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 251–52 (2009) (recalling the five key
prerequisites for bridging the digital divide articulated in the earlier article).
24. See Scott Louie, The New Invisible Man, YO! YOUTH OUTLOOK (Nov. 1, 1999)
(describing experience as “the new millennium’s Invisible Man” after unplugging the modem for
a few days), cited in Yu, supra note 7, at 9 n.49.
25. See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 13 (2018)
(“[T]echno-social engineering can mold us while going unnoticed and unchallenged . . . .”).
26. See infra text accompanying note 116 (discussing the limited understanding of
algorithmic operations).
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algorithms steer individuals away from the active or equal participation
in the new technological environment. The harm that these algorithms
could cause may range from “biases and bugs”27 to the dehumanizing
aspect of algorithmic operations.28
B. Access
Access is the most widely discussed attribute of the algorithmic
divide. While the use of algorithms can provide important individual and
societal benefits, not everybody has access to algorithm-enhanced
technological products and services. At the domestic level, individuals
will be shut out because they cannot afford these products and services,
cannot find them on the local market, or do not have the needed skills to
use them effectively.29
At the global level, the access challenge has become even more acute,
especially when one takes into consideration the limited access to
computing, Internet, and sophisticated communication technologies in
the developing world.30 While the Internet-penetration rates for Japan,
the United States, and the United Kingdom are over 90%, the
corresponding rates for Burundi, the Central African Republic, Eritrea,
27. ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, CROWD: HARNESSING
OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 53 (2017).
28. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 25, at 1 (“[T]echno-social engineering of
humans exists on an unprecedented scale and scope, and it is only growing more pervasive as we
embed networked sensors in our public and private spaces, our devices, our clothing, and
ourselves.”); LEE, supra note 6, at 173 (noting that artificial intelligence will provide “a direct
assault on [the] sense of identity and purpose” of many workers); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra
note 22, at 9–11, 42–56 (surveying views on the loss of humanity and human judgment when data
and predictive modeling become paramount); Andrew C. Michaels, Artificial Intelligence, Legal
Change, and Separation of Powers, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 28),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459069 [https://perma.cc/4J7P-48ME] (“[T]he arguments for AI
judges underappreciate and undervalue the human aspects of law.”); see also Guido Noto La
Diega, Against the Dehumanisation of Decision-Making—Algorithmic Decisions at the
Crossroads of Intellectual Property, Data Protection, and Freedom of Information, 9 J. INTELL.
PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 33 (2018) (“[W]e should trust our fellow human
beings over the algorithms, despite developments in artificial intelligence allowing the
deployment of increasingly refined legal applications.”).
29. See discussion infra Sections I.C, I.D, I.E (discussing unaffordability, unavailability,
and inadaptability).
30. See Maria De-Arteaga et al., Machine Learning for the Developing World, ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON MGMT. INFO. SYS., Aug. 2018, at 9:1, 9:2 (“Availability of data, computational
capacity, and Internet accessibility are often markedly more limited than in developed
countries.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 4–5 (discussing the alarming disparities between developed and
developing countries in their access to information technology); see also Pratap Khedkar &
Dharmendra Sahay, Trends in Healthcare and Medical Innovation, in THE GLOBAL INNOVATION
INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 87, 87 (Soumitra
Dutta et al. eds., 2019) (noting that “90% of the developed world and 41% of the developing world
[are] on broadband”).
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and Western Sahara are around or below 5%.31 As a result, access to
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services in the
developing world cannot be taken for granted. As stated in the final report
of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital
Cooperation, cochaired by Melinda Gates and Jack Ma:
Well more than half the world’s population still either lacks
affordable access to the internet or is using only a fraction of
its potential despite being connected. People who lack safe
and affordable access to digital technologies are
overwhelmingly from groups who are already marginalised:
women, elderly people and those with disabilities;
indigenous groups; and those who live in poor, remote or
rural areas.32
To a large extent, much of the prior research on information and
communication technology for development33—or “ICT4D” for short—
can provide instructive lessons for addressing development-related
challenges in the age of artificial intelligence.34 Among the strategies
proposed for developing countries are an increase in the ability to handle
small and messy datasets, the development of intelligent data-acquisition
strategies and compression algorithms, the creation of transfer-learning

31. See Internet in Europe Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://www.internet
worldstats.com/stats4.htm [https://perma.cc/M6J6-P2Y7] (last updated July 24, 2019) (reporting
the Internet-penetration rate for the United Kingdom at 94.6%); Internet Usage in Asia, INTERNET
WORLD STATS, https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm [https://perma.cc/9Q4B-T3BW]
(last updated Sept. 26, 2019) (reporting the Internet-penetration rate for Japan at 93.5%); Internet
Usage Statistics for All the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://internetworld
stats.com/stats2.htm [https://perma.cc/A2EJ-2ZQ2] (last updated Sept. 10, 2019) (reporting the
Internet-penetration rate for the United States at 95.6%); Internet Users Statistics for Africa,
INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [https://perma.cc/5ZGMULSH] (last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (reporting the Internet-penetration rates for Burundi, the
Central African Republic, Eritrea, and Western Sahara at 5.3%, 5.3%, 1.3%, and 4.8%,
respectively).
32. U.N. Sec’y-Gen.’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation, The Age of Digital
Interdependence, at 6 (June 10, 2019) [hereinafter High-level Panel Report] (footnote omitted).
33. See Amir Hatem Ali, Note, The Power of Social Media in Developing Nations: New
Tools for Closing the Global Digital Divide and Beyond, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 185, 193 (2011)
(“Proponents of addressing the digital divide argue that economic depravity, poor education, and
deficient healthcare might be addressed on a structural level by providing developing nations with
infrastructure and skills to compete in the national economy, in which ICT [information and
communication technology] is undoubtedly an essential tool.”). See generally Executive Board of
U.N. Development Programme & U.N. Population Fund, Role of UNDP in Information and
Communication Technology for Development, U.N. Doc. DP/2001/CRP.8 (June 8, 2001)
(discussing the ICT4D efforts taken by the U.N. Development Programme).
34. See generally De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30 (examining the burgeoning literature on
“machine learning for the developing world”).
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models35 for low-resource languages, the facilitation of machine learning
with limited computational capabilities, and the utilization of decision
support systems.36
C. Affordability
Affordability goes hand in hand with access, yet the two attributes
raise different considerations. While the lack of economic and
technological resources may lead to inaccessibility, it could also
determine the type of product and service that an individual could access
and the frequency at which that individual could utilize the selected
product or service. In addition, because affordability limits one’s ability
to “upgrad[e] the equipment, software, and training support,”37 this
attribute of the algorithmic divide will affect the overall quality of the
products and services that the individual enjoys.
To a large extent, affordability determines not only individual access
to machine learning and artificial intelligence but also one’s ability to
fully participate in the artificial intelligence revolution. The less access
one can afford, the more limited benefits one will secure from algorithmenhanced technological products and services, and the less likely one will
be able to fully realize the promise of machine learning and artificial
intelligence.
D. Availability
There is a general assumption that individuals will have the needed
technological products or services if machine-learning capabilities
become accessible and affordable. Yet, that assumption cannot always be
supported given the differing individual needs for products and
services.38 It is not uncommon that the specific type of product or service
needed by an individual does not exist. Even if it does, that product or
service may feature algorithms designed by those who do not fully grasp
the user’s specific needs, interests, conditions, and priorities, especially
those in the developing world. As Ralph Hamann lamented: “AI
algorithms are developed almost entirely in developed regions. Thus they
may not sufficiently reflect the contexts and priorities of developing
countries.”39
35. For overviews of “transfer learning” in the deep learning context, see generally JOHN
D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 236–37 (2019); Jason Brownlee, A Gentle Introduction to Transfer
Learning for Deep Learning, MACHINE LEARNING MASTERY (Dec. 20, 2017), https://machine
learningmastery.com/transfer-learning-for-deep-learning/ [https://perma.cc/M9N8-9GVU].
36. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:9 to :10.
37. Yu, supra note 7, at 12.
38. See id. at 13 (“Even with Internet access, many people may not be able to find
information that is relevant to their lives and communities.”).
39. Hamann, supra note 8.
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Since the mid-2010s, commentators have widely discussed the
problem of algorithmic bias and discrimination,40 which Section II.B will
discuss in greater detail. While this problem has produced undesirable
outcomes that harm select individuals, it could shut these individuals out
of access entirely. Thus, regardless of whether they are intentional,41
algorithmic bias and discrimination threaten to take away the benefits that
machine learning and artificial intelligence provide to a large segment of
the population.
E. Adaptability
If individuals are to succeed in the age of artificial intelligence, they
will need to take advantage of the different algorithm-enhanced
technological products and services. They will also need to adapt these
new technologies to their individual needs.42 Only after they have made
successful adaptation can they realize the full potential of machine
learning and artificial intelligence.
Adaptability, however, requires both knowledge and understanding
(in addition to awareness). In this age of artificial intelligence,
algorithmic literacy is just as important as algorithmic awareness. As
Section III.A will discuss in greater detail, policy makers will need to put
in place programs to enhance the algorithmic literacy of their
constituencies.43 Should those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic

40. See generally Nizan Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and
Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88 (Woodrow
Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018) (discussing discrimination in the context of machine-learning
algorithms); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 671 (2016) (discussing the disparate impact caused by the use of big-data analytics);
Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519 (2018) (examining
algorithmic decision-making through an antistereotypical lens); Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in
Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019) (discussing algorithm-generated racial
inequity in the criminal justice system); Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017) (discussing data-driven discrimination in the employment
context); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017)
(discussing the disparate impact caused by the use of big-data analytics to provide predictive
policing); Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV.
1375 (2014) (discussing discrimination in social-scoring systems).
41. See Balkin, supra note 12, at 1233 (“We can’t argue that the algorithm itself has bad
intentions. Rather, the algorithm is used by human beings who want to achieve some particular
set of managerial goals, but in the process, end up harming various groups of people.”).
42. Cf. Yu, supra note 7, at 15 (“Access to information technology and Internet content
is . . . useful only if people are able to adapt to the changing technological environment and to use
the new technological tools effectively.”).
43. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4

12

Yu and Yu: The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial Inte

2020]

THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

343

divide fail to adequately respond to this fast-evolving technological
environment, they will likely be left behind.44
II. PROBLEMS
Although Part I focused on the five attributes of the algorithmic
divide, it is important not to dismiss this divide as a mere theoretical
construct. Instead, the divide has generated three real-life problems that
will deeply affect whether and how individuals are to benefit from
machine learning and artificial intelligence. While the first two
problems—algorithmic deprivation and algorithmic discrimination—
have primary impacts on those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic
divide, the last problem—algorithmic distortion—affects virtually
everybody. Taken together, these three problems demonstrate how the
emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide will affect all users in
some way regardless of whether they sit on the fortunate or unfortunate
side.
A. Algorithmic Deprivation
As the previous Part noted, those who have no access to algorithmenhanced technological products and services will be shut out of the
benefits provided by machine learning and artificial intelligence.
Although commentators have documented the various problems caused
by algorithms and intelligent machines, one cannot overlook the many
promises that these technologies provide,45 especially in areas in which
they have shown to have outperformed human actors.46 Just like all other
44. One commentator described the adaptation process as follows:
Smart(er) new apps and platforms will require people to learn how to understand
the nature of the new experience, learn how it is guided by software, and learn to
interact with the new environment. That has tended to be followed by a catch-up
by people who learn then to game the system, as well as navigate it more speedily
and reject experiences that don’t meet expectations or needs. The major risk is
that less-regular users, especially those who cluster on one or two sites or
platforms, won’t develop that navigational and selection facility and will be at a
disadvantage.
RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 63 (quoting Pete Cranston, Co-Dir., Euroforic Servs.).
45. See AMY PAUL ET AL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., REFLECTING THE PAST, SHAPING
THE FUTURE: MAKING AI WORK FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 4 (2018), https://www.usaid.
gov/sites/default/files/documents/15396/AI-ML-in-Development.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8TTAGEY] (“Emerging [machine-learning and artificial-intelligence] applications promise to reshape
healthcare, agriculture, and democracy in the developing world. [These technologies] show
tremendous potential for helping to achieve sustainable development objectives globally.”
(emphasis omitted)).
46. Examples abound in the health area:
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new technologies, algorithm-enhanced technological products and
services have their strengths and drawbacks.47
AI technology has been utilized to improve the quality of medical diagnosis,
especially in radiology, due to the large volumes of medical image data. A
radiologist, Keith Dreyer at Harvard Medical School, claimed that “Meaningful
AI will improve quality, efﬁciency, and outcomes.” Esteva et al. trained deep
convolutional neural networks (CNN) based on a dataset of 129,450 clinical
images to diagnose skin cancer. The results demonstrated that this system is able
to classify skin cancer at a comparable level to dermatologists. They
hypothesized that smartphones might be a low-cost method of helping to extend
the reach of dermatologists to improve access to diagnostic care. Liu from
Google, Inc. reported a CNN framework to aid the pathological diagnosis of
breast cancer metastasis in lymph nodes. The results showed that this system
could improve the speed, accuracy, and consistency of diagnosis, as well as
reduce the false negative rate to a quarter of the rate experienced by human
pathologists.
Jonathan Guo & Li Bin, The Application of Medical Artiﬁcial Intelligence Technology in Rural
Areas of Developing Countries, 2 HEALTH EQUITY 174, 175 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see also
Digital Decisions, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., https://cdt.org/files/2018/09/Digital-Decisions
-Library-Printer-Friendly-as-of-20180927.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVA8-BD5V] (“Algorithms can
help doctors read and prioritize X-rays, and they are better and faster than humans at detecting
credit card fraud.” (footnote omitted)).
47. As Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson observed in their new book, Machine
Platform Crowd:
We . . . see both a challenge and opportunity in the growing reliance on
algorithmic decision making. The challenge is that this approach can embed and
perpetuate unfair, harmful, and unwanted biases. What’s worse, these biases may
emerge despite the best intentions of the designers to create unbiased systems,
and they may be difficult to identify without extensive testing. All system design
must confront this challenge.
The opportunity is that machine-based systems typically can be tested and
improved. And once corrected, they are unlikely to make the same mistake again.
In contrast, it is a lot harder to get humans to acknowledge their biases (how
many avowed racists or sexists do you know?), let alone the hard work required
to overcome them. The ultimate standard for adopting a decision-making
system—whether based on machines, on humans, or on some combination of the
two—cannot realistically be perfection. Any system is likely to make mistakes
and have biases. Instead, the goal should be to choose an approach that minimizes
biases and errors, and that allows them to be easily and quickly corrected.
MCAFEE & BRYNJOLFSSON, supra note 27, at 52–53; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22,
at 2 (“Algorithms are aimed at optimizing everything. They can save lives, make things easier,
and conquer chaos. Still, experts worry they can also put too much control in the hands of
corporations and governments, perpetuate bias, create filter bubbles, cut choices, creativity and
serendipity, and could result in greater unemployment.” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 18 (“If we use
machine learning models rigorously, they will make things better; if we use them to paper over
injustice with the veneer of machine empiricism, it will be worse.” (quoting Cory Doctorow,
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Thus far, commentators have identified a number of areas in which
machine learning and artificial intelligence can help the poor, the
vulnerable, and the disadvantaged.48 To underscore the promise of these
technologies, this Section highlights their benefits in the developing
world. Even though these benefits also inure to those in the developed
world,49 the illustrations focus on developing countries for two reasons.
First, because these countries contain some of the world’s most
disadvantaged populations, the illustrations’ usefulness will go beyond
the developing world. Second, as the digital divide literature has shown,
more research has been, and will be, devoted to communications issues
involving the poor and the disadvantaged in developed countries.50 This
Section therefore highlights developments that are unlikely to receive the
needed attention from policy makers and commentators.51
The first area that provides an excellent illustration of the promise of
machine learning and artificial intelligence is disaster relief. The oft cited
example is Nepal, which suffered from a devastating earthquake in
Kathmandu, its capital, in April 2015.52 Shortly after that earthquake,
machine learning and artificial intelligence were deployed, alongside
drones and other automated devices, to facilitate the rescue, relief, and

Author)). One may recall similar “good or evil” analyses regarding other new media technologies,
which range from film to television to the Internet. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 232 (“Previous
technological breakthroughs have commonly generated exaggerated hopes that machines can
transform society and democracy. Luddites fear for the worse, but technophiles hope for the
better.”); RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 22 (noting the differing views of techno-optimists, technoskeptics, and techno-pessimists concerning whether the Internet reduces or reinforces social
inequalities).
48. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 52–70.
49. See EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 81–82 (“New high-tech tools allow for more precise
measuring and tracking, better sharing of information, and increased visibility of targeted
populations. In a system dedicated to supporting poor and working-class people’s selfdetermination, such diligence would guarantee that they attain all the benefits they are entitled to
by law.”). But see NORRIS, supra note 13, at 10 (“Technological opportunities are often unevenly
distributed, even in nations like Australia, the United States, and Sweden at the forefront of the
information society.”).
50. See, e.g., MACK, supra note 18 (discussing the digital divide and the intersection of race
and technology, with a focus on the United States); FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 17
(providing the concluding report of the Clinton Administration’s Falling Through the Net series).
51. For additional examples, see generally materials provided through the “AI for Good”
Global Summit, organized by the International Telecommunication Union. AI FOR GOOD GLOBAL
SUMMIT, https://aiforgood.itu.int/ [https://perma.cc/P9GN-NFNL].
52. See Mark Brown, Nepal Earthquake Destroys Kathmandu Valley’s Architectural
Treasures, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2015, 2:30 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/
27/nepal-earthquake-destroys-kathmandu-valleys-architecture-buildings-heritage [https://perma.
cc/VT6V-9VL3] (reporting the earthquake).
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reconstruction efforts.53 As a Nepalese executive of a New York–based
provider of artificial intelligence solutions and services recounted:
[P]redictive models for disaster relief enable first responders
to automatically analyze large-scale behavior and movement
through multiple sources of data including social media
platforms, web forums, news sources, etc. Based on
collected data, responders can scale reconstruction efforts
and distribute supplies in a timely manner. In 2015, when a
major earthquake hit Nepal, more than 8 million people were
affected. During the aftermath, drones were used to map and
assess the destruction and speed up the rescue mission.
The town of Sankhu, situated about 20 kilometers
northeast of Kathmandu, was among the highly affected
locations. In May 2018, my company Fusemachines and
GeoSpatial Systems partnered with Sankhu’s city officials to
use drones and artificial intelligence in an effort to
automatically estimate the reconstruction need. After
processing data accumulated from a drone-powered aerial
mapping of the region, the team fed this data to advanced
machine learning algorithms. Combining drone imagery,
digital mapping and machine learning, the team configured
region modeling and infrastructure development with higher
accuracy.54
53. See Sameer Maskey, AI for Humanity: Using AI to Make a Positive Impact in
Developing Countries, FORBES (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbes
techcouncil/2018/08/23/ai-for-humanity-using-ai-to-make-a-positive-impact-in-developingcountries-2 [https://perma.cc/MED5-VPA3] (recounting the disaster rescue, relief, and
reconstruction efforts in Nepal); see also How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing
Countries, DAY TRANSLATIONS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.daytranslations.com/blog/2018/
11/how-ai-is-helping-undeveloped-and-developing-countries-12899/ [https://perma.cc/BV8CMULL] (“The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs . . . used
artificial intelligence to pinpoint and map all social media posts related to the Nepal earthquake
emergency needs, damage to infrastructure, and disaster response activities.”).
54. Maskey, supra note 53. As another commentator explained:
AI-assisted disaster response operations have become more efficient
because of the smart consolidation of a myriad of information. It made it easy to
find the best routes to take when going to a calamity-struck site as the AI system
determined the infrastructure damaged and those that are still usable. Digital
maps were generated to help aid workers in providing the needed help promptly
and safely. It became easier to work on at least three types of data (texts, images,
and videos).
The system used by [the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs] is referred to as AIDR (Artificial Intelligence for Disaster
Response). It is capable of learning from how it is being used and the data
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The second area that showcases the benefits of machine learning and
artificial intelligence is public health. Because the ratio between doctors
and patients in developing countries is always dramatically higher than
the corresponding ratio in their developed counterparts,55 the use of
machine learning and artificial intelligence is badly needed to train
doctors, nurses, and other health professionals as well as to provide
medical assistance.56 In recent years, developing countries have
successfully utilized these technologies to improve healthcare. As noted
in a contribution to the Global Innovation Index 2019 report:
China is turning to AI-based technologies to provide
better healthcare, especially in rural areas where doctors are
relying on perceptual senses, like vision and hearing, to
gather information about patient health. In India, Arvind Eye
Care is working with Google Brain to detect signs of
diabetes-related eye disease by analyzing photographs.57
inputted into it, allowing it to identify humanitarian aid needs automatically, sort
data (according to the following categories: urgent needs, response efforts, and
infrastructure damage), and disseminate accurate and useful information. The
more AIDR is used, the better it gets.
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53.
55. See Guo & Li, supra note 46, at 177 (“Due to the poor working environment, it is
difﬁcult to attract and retain high-quality healthcare providers in rural areas. To compensate for
the shortage of physicians, many developing countries launch some abbreviated training programs
for becoming a physician, or they authorize nurses to perform certain physician tasks.”); Adebayo
Alonge, How AI Can Help Africa Get Universal Health Care Before America, NEWSWEEK (Oct.
30, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/artificial-intelligence-us-healthcare-africa693849 [https://perma.cc/SRD2-UDEP] (“Across Africa, the ratio of doctors to patients is
painfully low. The continent accounts for 25 percent of global disease cases, but has only 2–3
percent of the doctors in the world.”).
56. As one commentator observed:
In many places such as Nepal and Africa, human medical experts are rarely
available. Physicians may need to consult with fellow doctors, particularly
experts in specific fields. Artificial intelligence can fill the gap, providing the
knowledge and analytical output doctors can use to come up with better diagnosis
and treatment plans.
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53; see also Guo & Li,
supra note 46, at 175 (“Although clinical work cannot be completely replaced by AI robot doctors
in the foreseeable future, medical AI technology will play a huge role in electronic health
records . . . , diagnosis, treatment protocol development, patient monitoring and care,
personalized medicine, robotic surgery, and health system management.”); id. at 176
(“[T]elerobots can facilitate communication between patients with medical professionals;
assistive walking devices can help with maneuvering, walking, standing, or sitting; and animallike robots can communicate with and entertain patients. Robots can also be used in surgery as
assistant surgeons.” (footnote omitted)).
57. Khedkar & Sahay, supra note 30, at 91 (footnote omitted).
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In Rwanda, “Zipline is using drones to deliver medical supplies and blood
to hospitals and clinics that are difficult to access by car.”58
The third area that demonstrates the potential of machine learning and
artificial intelligence is food production. In developing countries, farmers
often have to travel long distances to sell crops, produce, and animals.59
With the information they secure through predictive algorithms, such as
crop prices, they will be in much better positions than in the past to
determine when to sell products.60 Algorithm-enhanced technologies will
also help them increase crop yield, telling them when to plant and fertilize
and what seeds to use based on local climate and soil conditions.61 To a
large extent, the Internet has already greatly improved the livelihoods of

58. Maskey, supra note 53. This delivery “has dramatically impacted people living in
remote parts of the country because they are able to get medical help when needed,” and “[t]he
drone system in Rwanda has . . . helped reduce waste of blood by 95%.” Id.
59. See Marcel Fafchamps & Ruth Vargas Hill, Selling at the Farmgate or Traveling to
Market, 87 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 717, 718 (2005) (“In contrast with farmers in developed countries
who often . . . enjoy good institutions and infrastructure, most farmers in developing countries
are . . . geographically isolated . . . and outside the reach of formal market institutions.”).
60. See NITI AAYOG, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 20 (2018)
(India), https://www.niti.gov.in/writereaddata/files/document_publication/NationalStrategy-forAI-Discussion-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7D8-MCNW] (noting that artificial intelligence “has
the potential to address challenges such as inadequate demand prediction” and has been used for
the “prediction of crop prices to inform sowing practices”).
61. As Bernard Marr observed:
AI technology . . . can help researchers figure out the right genetic makeup to
create seeds that generate the highest yield, the most nutrition, and the most
disease-resistant strains of staple crops. There are 40,000 varieties of sorghum, a
valuable cereal crop in developing countries such as Ethiopia and India. AI can
be used to experiment with these varieties to develop the perfect crop. All the
growth, genetic, and environmental data collected during research will be given
to an AI model to process. AI algorithms are better able to review all the variables
and varieties to identify patterns and insights faster than humans. Deep-learning
AI will be able to comprehend the complex genetics of plants that will support
better breeding of plants. Those more efficient plants will improve our food
production.
Bernard Marr, How Artificial Intelligence Can Help Fight World Hunger, SAP INSIDER (Jan. 10,
2018), https://sapinsider.wispubs.com/Assets/Articles/2018/January/How-Artificial-IntelligenceCan-Help-Fight-World-Hunger [https://perma.cc/WUD8-4D7T]; see also PAUL ET AL., supra
note 45, at 26 (“[A machine-learning] model can recommend crop management practices that are
tailored to local soil type, plant varieties, and climate forecasts.”); How AI Is Helping
Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53 (“The [machine-generated] sowing
advisories sent to farmers include information on the best time for land preparation, sowing date,
and fertilizer application.”); Maskey, supra note 53 (“Farmers monitor crops more effectively and
make better predictions on planting, weeding and harvesting using AI tools. It can also be used to
analyze one plant at a time and add pesticides only to infected plants and trees instead of spraying
pesticides across large swaths of crops.”).
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farmers in developing countries.62 The use of machine learning and
artificial intelligence will provide further improvements by giving them
more and better information and by strengthening their predictive
abilities.
The fourth area that exemplifies the success provided by machine
learning and artificial intelligence is education. Thus far, these
technologies have been deployed to address the shortage of teachers and
easily accessible schools.63 Computers equipped with learning algorithms
have also been used as tutors.64 These “intelligent” tutors not only can
track the participants’ progress but will also be able to adjust teaching
coverage and pace based on such progress. As Nizan Packin and Yafit
Lev-Aretz observed:
Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) have rapidly moved
from laboratory experimental stages to real everyday use.
When learners work on a problem-solving task, ITS track
mental steps to diagnose errors and appraise their
understanding of the domain. Learners can also enjoy ITS’s
timely guidance, feedback and explanations, and be matched

62. See Charlie Mitchell, Technology Hope for African Farmers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/3316885c-b07d-11e8-87e0-d84e0d934341 [https://perma.cc/
WT6N-FERU] (“[D]igital services allow smallholders to view real-time crop prices, raise capital
and crowdfund on their computers and smart devices.”).
63. As one commentator recounted:
In most developing countries, schools lack experienced teachers and resources
to enhance students’ knowledge. As a result, many students still have to walk
long distances to get to the nearest school, which has created education gaps,
especially in rural areas. AI tools such as personalized learning assistants can
simplify learning by making tutoring services and learning materials accessible
to all students, wherever they are. Machines can be automated to help students
learn basic concepts without a tutor . . . . This would allow students to learn at
any time from anywhere.
Maskey, supra note 53; see also De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:6 (“[T]eacher shortages are
common in rural areas of the developing world. If machines could augment and support human
teaching responsibilities, this could help increase literacy and sharpen STEM [science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics] skills, paving a road to improve development.”
(citation omitted)). For the benefits of both developed and developing countries, teaching robots
can cover not only the present but also the past. See generally Michal Shur-Ofry & Guy Pessach,
Robotic Collective Memory, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 975 (2019) (discussing issues raised by virtual
witnesses who help convey memories from the Holocaust).
64. See U.N. EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
EDUCATION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 12 (2019) (“AI
was part of the vision promising to transform education by creating tutor systems that could
personalise learning.”).
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with learning activities at an individually-tailored level of
difficulty and interest.65
To better tailor the teaching and learning experiences to the participants’
specific needs, interests, and capabilities, these tutors can utilize the
growing amount of open-access courseware that has already appeared in
both developed and developing countries.66 Machine learning and
artificial intelligence have also been utilized for grading and other
purposes.67
The last area that illuminates the possibilities generated by greater use
of machine learning and artificial intelligence involves policy analysis.
As Maria De-Arteaga and her collaborators observed, “Whether it is
through knowledge-discovery models that improve our understanding of
a phenomenon, or through predictive models that inform proactive
policies, [machine learning] can be integrated as an essential component
of decision support systems.”68 For instance, scientists have utilized
machine-learning capabilities, survey data, and satellite images of
differential nighttime luminosity to map poverty levels in African
countries where estimates of consumption expenditure and asset wealth
have been incomplete or lacking.69 A group of researchers at
Development Seed also teamed up with the World Bank to utilize big65. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 108. A frequently cited example is Cape Town–
based Daptio:
Daptio [is] an adaptive learning platform that makes use of artificial intelligence
to help students study remotely. It specializes in courses whose content,
structure, and assessments are designed to adjust based on the strengths and
weaknesses of the students. Daptio is designed to serve a learning model that is
deemed best suited to a specific student.
How AI Is Helping Undeveloped and Developing Countries, supra note 53; see also UNESCO,
supra note 64, at 14 (discussing Daptio).
66. A widely cited example is the open courseware provided by the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. See Mass. Inst. of Tech., MIT OPEN COURSEWARE, https://ocw.mit.edu/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/94R5-TZFS].
67. See Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 108 (“[M]assive open online courses and
other models of online education increasingly use AI. Many of the popular online education
platforms, including EdX, Coursera, and Udacity, use [natural-language processing], machine
learning, and crowdsourcing for grading students’ assignments and programming tasks.”); see
also UNESCO, supra note 64, at 13 (“A dual-teacher model entailing a teacher and a virtual
teaching assistant, which can take over the teacher’s routine task, frees up teachers’ time, enabling
them to focus on student guidance and one-to-one communication.”).
68. De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:7.
69. Neal Jean et al., Combining Satellite Imagery and Machine Learning to Predict Poverty,
353 SCIENCE 790, 790 (2016); see also PAUL ET AL., supra note 45, at 50 (“One of the most welldeveloped use cases for [machine learning] in international development is the automated analysis
of satellite imagery. . . . Satellite imagery can provide invaluable information about human
settlement patterns, land use, and infrastructure.”).
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data analytics and machine-learning capabilities to analyze the urban
dynamics in Ethiopian lowlands.70 By providing greater, better, and more
complete information, machine learning and artificial intelligence have
put policy makers in better positions to design, evaluate, and improve
policies.
Taken together, the examples in these five areas illustrate the many
benefits that machine learning and artificial intelligence have provided to
developing countries. They explain why it is just as urgent to bridge the
algorithmic divide in developing countries as it is to bridge that divide in
developed countries. The examples also show that different areas need
varying levels of access to machine learning and artificial intelligence.71
While some areas, such as public health, food production, and education,
need large-scale access to these technologies, other areas, such as disaster
relief and policy analysis, may require only access on the part of the
government and some other key players.
As if the wide-ranging benefits that machine learning and artificial
intelligence have provided to developing countries were not appealing
enough, efforts to bridge the algorithmic divide in developing countries
can generate three types of collateral benefits to developed countries.
First, commentators have widely noted the network effects generated by
the increased global use of information and communication technology,72
which will create economy of both scale and scope. Second, as Mark
Cooper observed in relation to Internet usage: “As the customer and
geographic base spreads, the load on the system can be balanced,
achieving higher overall utilization rates. Spreading the customer base
across geographic areas would allow time zone differences to balance the
load as well.”73 The same would apply to machine learning and artificial
intelligence, especially regarding those algorithm-driven artificial
intelligence systems that are usable in both developed and developing
countries. Finally, because big-data analytics are increasingly deployed
70. Zhuangfang NaNa Yi, Accurate Machine Learning in Data-Sparse Environments,
MEDIUM (Apr. 4, 2019), https://medium.com/devseed/accurate-machine-learning-in-data-sparseenvironments-afad1101a928 [https://perma.cc/2Z9E-YZ5T].
71. Thanks to Chris Drahozal for pushing me on this point.
72. As Mark Cooper observed:
At the core of the [digital-transformation] process is a virtuous circle that
uniquely affects these industries. Improvements in computers and software can
be used to produce further improvements in computers and software. Network
effects mean that as more people use these products, the products become more
valuable to each user, stimulating more people to join the network and use it
more intensely.
Mark N. Cooper, Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All the
Attention It Gets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73, 73 (2002).
73. Id. at 84–85.
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in algorithm-enhanced technological products and services, having
comprehensive datasets that include individuals on both sides of the
algorithmic divide is imperative.74 As Woodrow Hartzog wrote
succinctly, “In the world of big data, more is always better.”75
To be sure, the introduction of algorithm-enhanced technological
products and services could lead to the problems of algorithmic
discrimination and distortion, both of which the next two Sections will
discuss in greater detail.76 When introduced without much consideration
of local contexts, these products and services could also generate
unintended consequences.77 As Chinmayi Arun lamented:
Ideas of the past like one laptop per child have resulted in
spectacular failure despite the bright-eyed optimism and
laudable intentions with which they were created.
Technology designed out of context may fail to take local
resources, social norms and cultural context into account.
“One day delivery” can mean very different things in Boston
and Hyderabad even if the system designed for both cities is
the same. Facebook can be fairly harmless in most countries
and find itself weaponised in a country with Myanmar’s
socio-political context, to contribute to genocide. It can take
effort for Google Maps to be able to account for the favelas
of Rio de Janeiro.78
Notwithstanding the different problems that algorithm-enhanced
technological products and services may generate, the many promises
these technologies provide suggest that individuals will be, on balance,
better off having the technologies than not having them in the first
place.79 In fact, the sooner those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic
74. See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing algorithmic distortion).
75. WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 51 (2018); see also VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG
DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 100 (2013)
(“[I]n the age of big data, all data will be regarded as valuable, in and of itself.”).
76. See discussion infra Sections II.B, II.C (discussing algorithmic discrimination and
distortion).
77. See generally Chinmayi Arun, AI and the Global South: Designing for Other Worlds,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICS OF AI (Markus D. Dubber et al. eds., forthcoming 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403010 [https://perma.cc/WCG7-PU7K] (noting the concerns raised
by out-of-context design and deployment of artificial intelligence in the global South).
78. Id. (manuscript at 3) (footnotes omitted); see also WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 65–
69 (discussing Brazil’s People’s Computer and India’s simputer).
79. In their book, Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger underscored the concern about the
techno-social engineering of humans and called for “the freedom to be off, to be free from technosocial engineering, to live and develop within underdetermined techno-social environments.”
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 25, at 269. While they made a convincing case about the
need for this freedom, there is no freedom to speak of if those on the unfortunate side of the
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divide can participate in the artificial intelligence revolution, the more
quickly they will be able to begin shaping the new technological
environment.80 Such shaping, and reshaping, will make the environment
more appealing and relevant to them in the long run.
Moreover, whether these products and services are beneficial or
harmful will largely depend on the design and use of the algorithms
involved. To help ensure proper design and usage, Part III will outline
select remedial actions that implicate ethics, transparency, accountability,
and competition.81 As that discussion will show, solutions can be
developed to maximize the benefits of algorithm-enhanced technological
products and services while minimizing their shortcomings.
Finally, regardless of whether those on the unfortunate side of the
algorithmic divide can secure ready and affordable access to these
products and services, those on the other side of the divide will still
actively deploy them. Such deployment will harm the technology poor by
accelerating job displacement82 while widening the gap between the
technology haves and have-nots.83 Given the sad reality that society
algorithmic divide are forced to be off. Only after their services have been turned on can they
have “the freedom to be off.”
80. Manuel Castells lamented the impact of the digital divide on the Internet:
The fact that the rise of the Internet took place in conditions of social
inequality in access everywhere may have lasting consequences on the structure
and content of the medium . . . . This is because users shape the Internet to an
even greater extent than any other technology because of the speed of
transmission of their feedback, and the flexibility of the technology. Thus, first
users may have shaped the Internet for the latecomers, both in terms of content
and of technology, in the same way that the pioneers of the Internet shaped the
technology for the masses of users in the 1990s.
MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY: REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNET, BUSINESS, AND
SOCIETY 255 (2001).
81. See discussion infra Sections III.C, III.D, III.E, III.F (proposing remedial actions
relating to ethics, transparency, accountability, and competition).
82. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE
ECONOMY 35 (2016) (“Job displacement is likely to be one of the most serious negative
consequences of AI-driven automation, impacting entire industries and communities.”); RAINIE
& ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 70–73 (surveying views on the rise of unemployment); Hamann,
supra note 8 (listing “worsening unemployment” as one of the key risks of technological advances
associated with artificial intelligence). As far as job displacement is concerned, the level of
displacement by machine learning and artificial intelligence will likely vary from sector to sector
and from country to country. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE
SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT
TECHNOLOGIES (2014) (examining the transformative impacts of emerging digital technologies on
jobs and the economy); Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and
Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254 (2018) (advancing reforms to address the future impact of
automation on jobs).
83. See Hamann, supra note 8 (listing “increasing concentration of economic power and
wealth” as another key risk of technological advances associated with artificial intelligence).
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cannot easily shelter the technology poor from the actions of the
technology rich—whether in developed or developing countries—
facilitating greater use of algorithm-enhanced technological products and
services is, to a large extent, a choice that everybody has to embrace. This
choice is similar to how individuals needed to adapt to the Internet in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s despite the medium’s many documented
shortcomings.84
B. Algorithmic Discrimination
In the past few years, commentators have highlighted the different
problems caused by algorithms, which range from errors to biases and
from discrimination to dehumanization.85 While Frank Pasquale
lamented how we now live in a “Black Box Society,”86 Cathy O’Neil
referred to machine-learning algorithms as “Weapons of Math
Destruction.”87
In February 2017, the Pew Research Center and the Imagining the
Internet Center at Elon University released their joint study, canvassing
more than 1000 “technology experts, scholars, corporate practitioners
and government leaders” for their views on the pros and cons of the
algorithmic age.88 Opening that report is a list containing some widely
reported problems generated by seemingly out-of-whack algorithms:
•

The British pound dropped 6.1% in value in seconds
on Oct. 7, 2016, partly because of currency trades
triggered by algorithms.

•

Microsoft engineers created a Twitter bot named
“Tay” . . . in an attempt to chat with Millennials by

84. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 68 (“The chief concern about the digital divide is that the
underclass of info-poor may become further marginalized in societies where basic computer skills
are becoming essential for economic success and personal advancement, entry to good career and
educational opportunities, full access to social networks, and opportunities for civic
engagement.”); FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 17, at 89 (“We are approaching the
point where not having access to [computers and the Internet] is likely to put an individual at a
competitive disadvantage and in a position of being a less-than-full participant in the digital
economy.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“Information technology is no longer a luxury, but a
development tool and a critical means of information exchange in the New Economy.” (footnote
omitted)).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 28, 40. In addition to discrimination, Jack Balkin
identified the following algorithmic harms: (1) harms to reputation; (2) normalization or
regimentation; (3) manipulation; and (4) lack of due process, transparency, or interpretability.
Balkin, supra note 12, at 1238–39.
86. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015).
87. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (Broadway Books 2017) (2016).
88. RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 4.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4

24

Yu and Yu: The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial Inte

2020]

THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

355

responding to their prompts, but within hours it was
spouting racist, sexist, Holocaust-denying tweets
based on algorithms that had it “learning” how to
respond to others based on what was tweeted at it.
•

Facebook tried to create a feature to highlight
Trending Topics from around the site in people’s
feeds. First, it had a team of humans edit the feature,
but controversy erupted when some accused the
platform of being biased against conservatives. So,
Facebook then turned the job over to algorithms only
to find that they could not discern real news from
fake news.89

As if these examples were not disturbing enough, in 2015, Google
“publicly apologize[d] after its object recognition algorithm tagged two
black users of Google Photo as ‘gorillas.’”90 Likewise, “Hewlett-Packard
(HP) suffered a serious public relations crisis when it was revealed that
its implementation of what was probably a bottom-up feature-based face
localization algorithm did not detect Black people as having a face,” due
largely to the fact that the “[c]ameras on new HP computers did not track
the faces of Black people in some common lighting conditions.”91 In a
speech, Ben Bernanke also relayed a story about how his request to
refinance a mortgage had been denied shortly after stepping down from
being the chair of the Federal Reserve.92 As a New York Times report
explained, “[I]n the thoroughly automated world of mortgage finance,
having recently changed jobs makes [him] a steeper credit risk.”93
Taken together, these examples show that algorithms can be error
prone, biased, or both. While algorithmic errors affect everybody having
access to algorithm-enhanced technological products and services,
algorithmic bias is particularly problematic for those on the unfortunate
side of the algorithmic divide. Indeed, many commentators fear that
algorithmic bias will have a disproportionate impact on the poor, the
disadvantaged, and the vulnerable.94
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic
Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 154 (2017).
91. Christian Sandvig et al., When the Algorithm Itself Is a Racist: Diagnosing Ethical
Harm in the Basic Components of Software, 10 INT’L J. COMM. 4972, 4973 (2016) (citations
omitted).
92. Neil Irwin, Why Ben Bernanke Can’t Refinance His Mortgage, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/upshot/why-ben-bernanke-cant-refinancehis-mortgage.html [https://perma.cc/F64T-QDXZ].
93. Id.
94. As Cathy O’Neil explained:
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Although algorithmic bias can be introduced intentionally through
overt discriminatory practices,95 most of the time biases enter algorithms
through covert actions—whether intentional or not.96 First, biases can
enter algorithms through what commentators have referred to as
“masking.”97 By utilizing complex algorithms, algorithm designers or

[Algorithm-driven weapons of math destruction] tend to punish the poor. This is,
in part, because they are engineered to evaluate large numbers of people. They
specialize in bulk, and they’re cheap. That’s part of their appeal. The wealthy,
by contrast, often benefit from personal input. A white-shoe law firm or an
exclusive prep school will lean far more on recommendations and face-to-face
interviews than will a fast-food chain or a cash-strapped urban school district.
The privileged, we’ll see time and again, are processed more by people, the
masses by machines.
O’NEIL, supra note 87, at 8; see also EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 12 (“Automated decision-making
shatters the social safety net, criminalizes the poor, intensifies discrimination, and compromises
our deepest national values.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 63–65 (surveying views on
whether the disadvantaged will lag behind even further in this algorithmic age).
95. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 682 (2017)
(“A prejudiced decisionmaker could skew the training data or pick proxies for protected classes
with the intent of generating discriminatory results.”).
96. Anupam Chander noted the unlikelihood of overt discrimination on the part of
algorithm designers:
First, because much of societal discrimination is subconscious or
unconscious, it is less likely to be encoded into automated algorithms than the
human decisionmakers that the algorithms replace. . . .
....
Second, even for programmers or companies who intend to discriminate, the
process of coding itself is likely to cause programmers to shy away from actually
encoding the discrimination. Even absent compelled disclosure through
litigation, there is the danger that a hard-coded discrimination will be revealed
later by hackers or by insiders disgusted by the discrimination. Moreover,
because code writing is likely to involve teams of programmers sharing code,
with different persons reviewing and debugging code, consciously coding
discrimination will likely require obtaining the cooperation of multiple persons,
which is likely to be a fraught task.
Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1028–29 (2017) (footnotes
omitted).
97. For discussions of the masking of discriminatory practices, see generally Barocas &
Selbst, supra note 40, at 712–14; Huq, supra note 40, at 1089–90; Zarsky, supra note 40, at 1389–
90. For illustrative purposes, “a system forbidden to use race as a variable might use other data,
such as media consumption or purchases of hair care products, to infer race and adjust the offered
pricing or services accordingly, and it might use factors that themselves reflect preexisting
patterns of discrimination, such as lower scores on standardized tests or longer commuting
distances to the site of a new job, as decision-making proxies.” JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH
AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 247 (2019).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4

26

Yu and Yu: The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial Inte

2020]

THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

357

their employers can mask discriminatory practices.98 As Aziz Huq
showed, masked discrimination in algorithmic design can be very
difficult to prove:
A discriminatory algorithm designer will leverage such
knowledge to fashion instruments that yield the disparate
racial effects they believe to be warranted a priori. Without
knowing the full spectrum of features that could,
conceivably, have been included in the training data—which
can be “enormous”—it will be difficult or impossible to
diagnose this kind of conduct absent direct evidence of
discriminatory intent. It will, moreover, be especially
difficult to show that, but for race, a specific feature would
or would not have been included, as the doctrine requires. A
basic principle of “feature selection” instructs that one
should keep the important features and discard the
unimportant ones. To the extent that masking occurs,
therefore, it seems clear that the litigation process would
rarely yield evidence of such intentional manipulation of the
algorithm’s design.99
Second, implicit biases can enter algorithms in two ways. First, these
biases can originate from algorithm designers who are neutral or wellintentioned, or who genuinely care about those on the unfortunate side of
the algorithmic divide.100 Second, the algorithms can rely on problematic
98. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 167 (“The profound capability of computers
to identify patterns in endless piles of unstructured data facilitates the masking of illegitimate
discrimination behind mirrors and proxies. Decision-making, automated or not, based on such
criteria should be banned.” (footnote omitted)); Nicholas Diakopoulos et al., Principles for
Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact Statement for Algorithms, FAT/ML,
https://www.fatml.org/resources/principles-for-accountable-algorithms [https://perma.cc/W8XLP3UK] (“‘The algorithm did it’ is not an acceptable excuse if algorithmic systems make mistakes
or have undesired consequences, including from machine-learning processes.” (emphasis
omitted)); see also Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35 (2013), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/
3/2016/08/DworkMullliganSLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/996Z-XVWW] (“While many companies
and government agencies foster an illusion that classification is (or should be) an area of absolute
algorithmic rule—that decisions are neutral, organic, and even automatically rendered without
human intervention—reality is a far messier mix of technical and human curating.”).
99. Huq, supra note 40, at 1089–90 (footnotes omitted); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra
note 40, at 712–14 (discussing the problem of masking and the related difficulty in proving
disparate treatment).
100. Kate Crawford described this problem as artificial intelligence’s “white guy problem”:
Like all technologies before it, artificial intelligence will reflect the values
of its creators. So inclusivity matters—from who designs it to who sits on the
company boards and which ethical perspectives are included. Otherwise, we risk
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historical online101 or offline data.102 With inappropriate data fed as either
input or training data,103 these algorithms will be caught in so-called
constructing machine intelligence that mirrors a narrow and privileged vision of
society, with its old, familiar biases and stereotypes.
Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-white-guy-problem
.html [https://perma.cc/8N73-MW2J]; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 12 (“The
algorithms will be primarily designed by white and Asian men—with data selected by these same
privileged actors—for the benefit of consumers like themselves.” (quoting Justin Reich, Exec.
Dir., MIT Teaching Sys. Lab)); Katyal, supra note 2, at 59 (“[A]lgorithmic models are . . . the
product of their fallible creators, who may miss evidence of systemic bias or structural
discrimination in data or may simply make mistakes. These errors of omission—innocent by
nature—risk reifying past prejudices, thereby reproducing an image of an infinitely unjust world.”
(footnote omitted)); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings: Information Technology Equity, the
Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 35, 55 (2003) (“Software reflects the biases of its creators, and tends to be biased
in favor of what are perceived by many to be boys’ interests.” (footnote omitted)); Hamann, supra
note 8 (lamenting how “AI algorithms are developed almost entirely in developed regions” and
“may not sufficiently reflect the contexts and priorities of developing countries”); Mariya Yao,
Fighting Algorithmic Bias and Homogenous Thinking in A.I., FORBES (May 1, 2017, 12:02 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mariyayao/2017/05/01/dangers-algorithmic-bias-homogenousthinking-ai [https://perma.cc/ZRW4-9DG2] (“When Timnit Gebru attended a prestigious AI
research conference last year, she counted 6 black people in the audience out of an estimated
8,500. And only one black woman: herself.”).
101. As Nizan Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz observed:
It is questionable how accurate and reliable Internet sources truly are.
Especially, as they are prone to data cleaning processes—a phenomenon that is
more typical in the case of social media data—as well as other types of outages,
random errors and gaps. The cleaning processes, errors, and outages raise
questions as to whether Internet sources and online data can represent an
objective truth or is any interpretation necessarily biased by some subjective
filter given the way that data is cleaned. Similarly, data loss, another frequent
occurrence, refers to the situation when information is destroyed by failures or
neglect in storage, transmission, or processing. Originating in Internet sources,
such errors, outages, and losses in large datasets are amplified when multiple
datasets are pulled together.
Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 40, at 91.
102. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New Personalization of
Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 333, 349 (2019) (“The question of whether an algorithm can achieve the
objective of the law turns on the quality of the data that a lawmaker relies on.”); Katyal, supra
note 2, at 79 (“[W]hen algorithms train on imperfect data, or are designed by individuals who may
be unconsciously biased in some manner, the results often reflect these biases, often to the
detriment of certain groups.”); Kim, supra note 40, at 861 (“Algorithms that are built on
inaccurate, biased, or unrepresentative data can in turn produce outcomes biased along lines of
race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”); Zarsky, supra note 40, at 1392–94 (discussing the
reliance on tainted datasets and data collection methods).
103. Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb distinguished between three types of
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“garbage in, garbage out” situations, causing the outcomes to be biased
against the excluded populations.104
While the existence of algorithmic bias alone is bad enough, the
problem can be exacerbated by the fact that machines learn themselves
by feeding the newly generated data back into the algorithms. Because
these data will become the new training and feedback data, algorithms
that are improperly designed or that utilize problematic data could
amplify real-world biases by creating self-reinforced feedback loops.105
As time passes, the biases generated through these loops will become
much worse than the biases found in the original algorithmic designs or
the initial training data.
C. Algorithmic Distortion
The
first
two
problems—algorithmic
deprivation
and
discrimination—affect primarily those on the unfortunate side of the
algorithmic divide. By contrast, the third problem—the distortion created
by improperly designed algorithms or a lack of appropriate data—affects
all users that rely on algorithms to develop policies or to understand,
manage, or improve the world.
For instance, when machine-learning algorithms are used to predict
economic developments at the national or global level, such algorithms
are unlikely to produce accurate analyses if the training data exclude
data that enter artificial intelligence systems: “Input data is used to power [the machine] to
produce predictions. Feedback data is used to improve it. . . . Training data is used at the
beginning to train an algorithm, but once the prediction machine is running, it is not useful
anymore.” AJAY AGRAWAL ET AL., PREDICTION MACHINES: THE SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 163 (2018).
104. See Peter K. Yu, Fair Use and Its Global Paradigm Evolution, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.
111, 157 (defining the “garbage in, garbage out” situation as one “in which incorrect input ends
up producing faulty output”).
105. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed:
[T]here is a strong risk that AI may reiterate and even amplify the biases and
flaws in datasets, even when these are unknown to humans. In this sense, AI has
a self-reinforcing nature, due to the fact that the machine’s outputs will be used
as data for future algorithmic operations.
Ronald Yu & Gabriele Spina Alì, What’s Inside the Black Box? AI Challenges for Lawyers and
Researchers, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 2, 4 (2019); see also Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges
in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 803, 827 (2017)
(“[A]lgorithmic self-reinforcing loops are now present across many spheres of our daily life (e.g.,
retail contexts, career contexts, credit decisions, insurance, Google search results, news
feeds) . . . .”); Katyal, supra note 2, at 69 (“Bad data . . . can perpetuate inequalities through
machine learning, leading to a feedback loop that replicates existing forms of bias, potentially
impacting minorities as a result.”); Digital Decisions, supra note 46 (“Unreliable or unfair
decisions that go unchallenged can contribute to bad feedback loops, which can make algorithms
even more likely to marginalize vulnerable populations.”).
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those on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide, which make up a
large segment of the population. Because biases in machine-generated
analyses can amplify themselves by feeding these biases into future
analyses, the unreliability of those analyses that omit data from the
unfortunate side of the algorithmic divide will increase over time. Such
analyses will eventually become much more unreliable than the initial
skewing caused by a lack of training data concerning that unfortunate
side.
At the global level, analyses that omit data from the technology poor
will become even more problematic. Oftentimes, big-data analytics,
machine learning, and artificial intelligence are deployed to address
global problems—be they reduction of poverty, improvement on public
health, enhancement on basic education, or relief to climate change.106 In
the area of climate change, for example, machine learning and artificial
intelligence have been actively utilized to track natural disasters,107
highlight alarming trends, and prevent man-made environmental
damage.108 Without the inclusion of information from the world’s most
vulnerable populations that are on the unfortunate side of the algorithmic
divide, any algorithmically generated analyses will likely be of limited or
no use to addressing these problems.
To be sure, in terms of the scope of the problem and the severity of its
impact, the problem of algorithmic distortion is no comparison to the
problem of algorithmic deprivation or discrimination. Nevertheless, in
terms of the scale of that impact, such distortion can be quite damaging,
as algorithmic distortion will prevent all users—on both sides of the
divide—from realizing the full potential of machine learning and
artificial intelligence.
Given the strong likelihood that the algorithmic divide will continue
to distort outcomes generated by algorithms, it is worth exploring when
such distortion warrants human intervention.109 Anthony Casey and
Anthony Niblett, for instance, noted the continuous role of humans in
algorithmic development:
106. See discussion supra Section II.A.
107. See Maskey, supra note 53 (noting the artificial intelligence program that “accurately
predicts seismic events and is . . . working on solutions for floods, wildfires and hurricanes”).
108. See De-Arteaga et al., supra note 30, at 9:4 (“[V]iolence in the developing world often
occurs in difficult to access rural areas. In order to prevent such atrocities, ‘crisis mapping’
provides spatio-temporal analyses of . . . environmental disasters.” (quoting Jen Ziemke, Crisis
Mapping: The Construction of a New Interdisciplinary Field?, 8 J. MAP & GEOGRAPHY LIBR. 101,
101 (2012))).
109. Article 22(3) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation requires a data controller
to “implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and
legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to
express his or her point of view and to contest [a decision based solely on automated processing,
including profiling].” Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 22(3), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46.
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Algorithmic decision-making does not mean that humans
are shut out of the process. Even after the objective has been
set, there is much human work to be done. Indeed, humans
are involved in all stages of setting up, training, coding, and
assessing the merits of the algorithm. If the objectives of the
algorithm and the objective of the law are perfectly aligned
at the ex ante stage, one must ask: Under what circumstances
should a human ignore the algorithm’s suggestions and
intervene after the algorithm has made the decision?110
Notwithstanding the need for and benefit of human intervention or
“supervision,”111 deciding when humans should intervene is not always
easy. As Professors Casey and Niblett continued:
Algorithms will often identify counterintuitive connections
that may appear erroneous to humans even when accurate.
Humans should be careful in those cases not to undo the very
value that was added by the algorithm’s ability to recognize
these connections. This is especially true when the benefit of
the algorithm was that it reduced human bias and behavioral
errors.112
III. SOLUTIONS
The previous Part identified three distinct problems, each of which
may call for the development of different solutions. Yet, these problems
overlap to some extent and at times may warrant common solutions. To
help bridge the algorithmic divide, this Part proposes seven non110. Casey & Niblett, supra note 102, at 354.
111. Machine learning can generally be separated into supervised and unsupervised learning,
with the latter having no predefined output. See generally ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING:
THE NEW AI 38–42, 111–18 (2016) (discussing supervised and unsupervised learning);
KELLEHER, supra note 35, at 26–30 (discussing supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement
learning). Supervision, in this case, will be to set parameters for the algorithmic operation or to
add predefined outputs to constrain that operation. Although unsupervised learning has become
increasingly attractive, due to its unlimited potential, most artificial intelligence systems combine
supervised- and unsupervised-learning techniques. See generally David Lehr & Paul Ohm,
Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 653 (2017) (providing an accessible overview of machine learning for lawyers).
112. Casey & Niblett, supra note 102, at 354; see also RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22,
at 40 (“People often confuse a biased algorithm for an algorithm that doesn’t confirm their biases.
If Facebook shows more liberal stories than conservative, that doesn’t mean something is wrong.
It could be a reflection of their user base, or of their media sources, or just random chance.”
(quoting an anonymous principal of a consulting firm)); Harry Surden & Mary-Anne Williams,
Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 158
(2016) (“[I]t is not uncommon for pilots in the cockpit to be surprised or confused by an automated
activity undertaken by an autopilot system.”). See generally Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas,
The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018) (documenting
the limitations of intuition while noting the need to address inscrutability).
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exhaustive clusters of remedial actions. Featuring law, communications
policy, ethical principles, institutional mechanisms, and business
practices, the wide variety of actions proposed in this Part aim to fashion
a holistic response to the multidimensional problems precipitated by the
algorithmic divide.
A. Literacy
From the individuals’ lack of awareness of algorithm-related
problems to their inability to adapt to machine learning and artificial
intelligence,113 increasing algorithmic literacy is crucial if a large
majority of the world’s population is to reap the benefits of these new
technologies.114 These individuals will need to know not only the impact
of machine learning and artificial intelligence on their daily lives but also
what it means to live in a society driven heavily by algorithms and
intelligent machines.115 Greater algorithmic literacy will help these
113. See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.E, II.B (discussing the need for awareness of and
adaptability to machine learning and artificial intelligence and the problem of algorithmic
discrimination).
114. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 142 (“Improving digital literacy of
citizens should be a high priority for the government and other organizations.”); PAUL ET AL.,
supra note 45, at 74 (“Strengthening training programs for data science and machine learning in
local development contexts can help create a pipeline of individuals who are ‘bilingual’ in the
sense of understanding local context and having the technical skills to take an active role in
developing [machine-learning] tools.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 74–76 (surveying
views on the need for algorithmic literacy); UNESCO, supra note 64, at 6–7 (“[T]eachers must
learn new digital skills to use AI in a pedagogical and meaningful way . . . .”); id. at 29
(identifying the new competencies needed by teachers to make more effective use of artificial
intelligence-enabled technologies); see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 82, at 32
(noting the need to “build[] on the President’s Computer Science for All initiative, which seeks to
give all students at the K–12 level access to coursework in computing and computational
thinking”).
115. The International Society for Technology in Education and the Computer Science
Teachers Association provided the following operational definition of computational thinking:
Computational thinking (CT) is a problem-solving process that includes (but is
not limited to) the following characteristics:
•

Formulating problems in a way that enables us to use a computer and
other tools to help solve them[]

•

Logically organizing and analyzing data

•

Representing data through abstractions such as models and simulations

•

Automating solutions through algorithmic thinking (a series of ordered
steps)

•

Identifying, analyzing, and implementing possible solutions with the
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individuals realize the full potential of machine learning and artificial
intelligence. It will also assist them in choosing away from undesirable
technological products and services that fail to protect privacy or other
individual rights.
In addition, a greater understanding of algorithmic operations will
allow individuals to develop human-generated responses to ensure more
successful engagement with algorithm-enhanced technological products
and services and the rapidly changing technological environment. While
most of these individuals are unlikely to be able to fully understand the
operation of the algorithms involved116—or, in some cases, no individual
will ever be able to develop such a full understanding—research has
shown that individuals are capable of developing responses that would
goal of achieving the most efficient and effective combination of steps
and resources
•

Generalizing and transferring this problem solving process to a wide
variety of problems[.]

INT’L SOC’Y FOR TECH. IN EDUC. & COMPUT. SCI. TEACHERS ASS’N, OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF
COMPUTATIONAL THINKING FOR K–12 EDUCATION (n.d.), https://id.iste.org/docs/ct-documents/
computational-thinking-operational-definition-flyer.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/5M9N-SBL2];
see also RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 101 (“Digital literacy . . . should not be confused with
technological skills; rather, it is an umbrella term that includes several skills, including:
information-finding skills; Internet skills; effective communication skills; functional skills;
collaboration skills; creative skills; shared knowledge; critical-thinking skills; social-networking
skills; career skills; and identity management skills.”); WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 113
(“Information literacies involve both computer-specific knowledge (e.g., mastery of browsing
software and search tools) and broader critical literacy skills (e.g., analysis and evaluation of
information sources).”). See generally PETER J. DENNING & MATTI TEDRE, COMPUTATIONAL
THINKING (2019) (providing an overview of computational thinking).
116. As Pedro Domingos lamented:
When algorithms become too intricate for our poor human brains to understand,
when the interactions between different parts of the algorithm are too many and
too involved, errors creep in, we can’t find them and fix them, and the algorithm
doesn’t do what we want. Even if we somehow make it work, it winds up being
needlessly complicated for the people using it and doesn’t play well with other
algorithms, storing up trouble for later.
DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 5; see also EUBANKS, supra note 2, at 184–85 (“The software,
algorithms, and models that power [the algorithm-driven digital poorhouse] are complex and often
secret.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19 (“Only the programmers are in a position to
know for sure what the algorithm does, and even they might not be clear about what’s going on.
In some cases there is no way to tell exactly why or how a decision by an algorithm is reached.”
(quoting Doc Searls, Dir., Project VRM, Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Harvard
Univ.)); Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[T]he algorithm may be too complicated for many
others to understand, or even if it is understandable, too demanding, timewise, to comprehend
fully.”); Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 638 (“The source code of computer systems is illegible to
nonexperts. In fact, even experts often struggle to understand what software code will do, as
inspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer program will behave.”).
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“trick” algorithms into providing more desirable results.117 Facebook
users, for example, have provided different information to improve
algorithmic outcomes.118 Research has also shown that users change their
behaviors in response to undesirable outcomes.119 Having strong
algorithmic literacy will therefore be crucial to making adjustments in
this new technological environment.
Finally, as policy makers and commentators have widely noted, the
age of artificial intelligence will result in massive job losses,120 especially
in developing countries.121 If individuals are to successfully transition to
117. The ability to manipulate results or game the system is often used to justify the
nondisclosure of algorithms. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[T]ransparency invites
manipulations by those who game those algorithms.”); Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 639 (“The
process for deciding which tax returns to audit, or whom to pull aside for secondary security
screening at the airport, may need to be partly opaque to prevent tax cheats or terrorists from
gaming the system.”).
118. See Caleb Garling, Tricking Facebook’s Algorithm, ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/tricking-facebooks-algorithm/375801/
[https://perma.cc/8BKJ-56WQ] (discussing the experience of tricking Facebook to elevate the
author’s post); Susarla, supra note 10 (“A study of Facebook usage found that when participants
were made aware of Facebook’s algorithm for curating news feeds, about 83% of participants
modified their behavior to try to take advantage of the algorithm, while around 10% decreased
their usage of Facebook.”); see also Jane Bambauer & Tal Zarsky, The Algorithm Game, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2018) (listing avoidance, altered conduct, altered input, and
obfuscation among the dominant gaming strategies deployed by users on Internet platforms).
119. See Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 295 (2019) (“Audiences
will inevitably alter their behavior under the influence of the algorithms they depend on, and these
behavioral changes then impact the data and data relationships that form the inputs to the same
algorithms, a mirrored parallel to the cycles of anticipation in design.”); see also Gillespie, supra
note 2, at 183–88 (discussing the algorithms’ entanglement with user behavior); Peter K. Yu, Can
Algorithms Promote Fair Use?, 14 FIU L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4–5),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3403712 [https://perma.cc/QYY9-PSKE] (discussing the potential
changes in creative choices and practices when algorithms are deployed to promote fair use in
copyright law).
120. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing how machine learning and artificial
intelligence would displace jobs).
121. As Lee Kai-fu observed:
AI-driven automation in factories will undercut the one economic advantage
developing countries historically possessed: cheap labor. Robot-operated
factories will likely relocate to be closer to their customers in large markets,
pulling away the ladder that developing countries like China and the “Asian
Tigers” of South Korea and Singapore climbed up on their way to becoming
high-income, technology-driven economies. The gap between global haves and
have-nots will widen, with no known path toward closing it.
LEE, supra note 6, at 20–21. Similarly, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers noted
the following in its draft guiding document:
The risk of unemployment for developing countries is more serious than for
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this new technological environment, they will need to acquire a high level
of algorithmic literacy. To a large extent, the lack of such literacy will
harm individuals the same way as the lack of computing or Internetrelated skills at the turn of this millennium, or even today.122 In the age
of artificial intelligence, policy makers should be well prepared to train,
and retrain, a large portion of their constituents to better adapt to the new
technological demands and challenges.
B. Amelioration
Just like how the changing technological environment could affect an
individual’s career opportunities, policy makers can easily anticipate and
sufficiently ameliorate the problems of algorithmic deprivation and
algorithmic discrimination. Not only will these policy makers need to
better understand the changing technological environment—through the
literacy-based solutions discussed above123—but they will also need to
take proactive actions to preempt or quickly address problems that the
algorithmic divide will precipitate. Successful responses to these
problems will generate algorithmic opportunities that will allow their
constituencies to fully participate in the artificial intelligence
revolution.124
Ameliorating algorithmic deprivation will require laws and policies
that facilitate greater technology diffusion to those in need. To a large
extent, the laws and policies needed in this area resemble those that were
developed countries. The industry of most developing countries is labor
intensive. While labor may be cheap(er) in developing economies, the ripple
effects will be felt much more than in the developed economies as more and more
jobs will be gradually replaced along with the development of robots or
[autonomous and intelligent systems].
INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 133–34.
122. See RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 101 (“A lack of basic ability in using computers and
surfing the net puts individuals in a disadvantaged position.”); see also WARSCHAUER, supra note
18, at 111–19 (noting the need for computer, information, multimedia, and computer-mediated
communication literacy); Ali, supra note 33, at 194 (“In today’s global economy, where
computers and the Internet are so fundamental to production and participation, it is clear that if
the right to development is to be taken seriously, that right must encompass the development of
ICT infrastructure and skills.”).
123. See discussion supra Section III.A (discussing the need to increase algorithmic literacy).
124. Cf. B. Keith Fulton, AOL Time Warner Foundation: Extending Internet Benefits to All,
20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 181 (2002) (“[W]orld leaders, captains of industry, local
politicians, community advocates and others have begun to embrace the notion of ‘digital
opportunity’ as a better way to quickly frame domestic and international efforts to extend the
benefits of the digital age to all.”); Yu, supra note 7, at 21–22 (discussing the Digital Opportunity
Taskforce established at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa, Japan, in July 2000). In addition to digital
opportunity, the term “digital dividend” has also been widely used to refer to the benefits provided
by digital technology. See, e.g., High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 6 (“Digital dividends
co-exist with digital divides.”).
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already introduced a decade or two ago to address the digital divide.125 In
the telecommunications field, for instance, policy makers have relied on
the introduction of universal service,126 such as the E-rate Program.127
Some European countries, such as “Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Spain,
have also mandated universal broadband access or recognized a right to
broadband services.”128
To be sure, there is a significant distinction between addressing
algorithmic deprivation and providing access to the Internet or other basic
telecommunications services. While the latter requires the provision of
free or affordable service, the former requires adaptation to a new
technological environment. Nevertheless, many capabilities relating to
machine learning and artificial intelligence have already been built into
easy-to-use technological products and services. For example, it does not
take much effort or knowledge to figure out how to use the auto-complete
feature in a software129 or to wait patiently for a self-learning computer
to provide better results. From that vantage point, facilitating access to
new algorithm-enhanced technological products and services is quite
similar to increasing one’s ability to utilize basic telecommunications
services.
Compared with efforts to tackle algorithmic deprivation, addressing
algorithmic discrimination requires different solutions. To begin with,
policy makers should introduce laws, policies, and institutional
mechanisms to prevent intentional algorithmic discrimination.130 In the
workplace, for instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964131
prohibits discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national

125. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 10 (identifying the measures taken by the Clinton
Administration to address the digital divide); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 205–17 (outlining the
concrete measures for closing the digital divide and preventing structural inequality, with a focus
on motivational, material, skills, and usage access).
126. See generally Milton Mueller, Telecommunications Access in the Age of Electronic
Commerce: Toward a Third-Generation Universal Service Policy, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 655 (1997)
(discussing the evolution of the universal-service policy in light of the changing demands and
expectations brought about by electronic commerce).
127. See Yu, supra note 7, at 10 n.53 (providing sources discussing the E-rate Program).
128. Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1422 (2010) (footnote
omitted).
129. Notwithstanding its benefits, this feature can also cause significant harm to individual
users. See generally Anne S.Y. Cheung, Defaming by Suggestion: Searching for Search Engine
Liability in the Autocomplete Era, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 467 (András Koltay ed., 2015) (discussing the defamatory results
generated by Google’s search algorithm).
130. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 135 (“[A]lgorithms that implement
discriminatory criteria are unlawful and/or unethical and must be purged.”).
131. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–68 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2018)).
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origin.”132 While commentators have noted the complications caused by
diverging legal standards and interpretations—such as those addressing
the difference between “disparate treatments” and “disparate
impacts”133—the biggest challenge in the age of artificial intelligence will
likely be the increased ability for those in support of discriminatory
practices to hide behind algorithms and machines—the masking problem
mentioned in Section II.B.134
Equally daunting is to address algorithmic discrimination that neutral
or well-intentioned efforts have caused. As the previous Part noted,
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services are often biased
or discriminatory because they are designed with implicit bias or rely on
problematic data.135 To address this complication, the next four Sections
will focus on remedial actions that implicate ethics, transparency,
accountability, and competition.136 Cumulatively these actions will help
address such unintentional discriminatory practices and outcomes.
Finally, addressing algorithmic distortion—and, to an equal extent,
algorithmic discrimination—requires the development of a more
inclusive environment.137 Such an environment needs to be diverse not
only in terms of those designing algorithms and related technological
products and services but also in terms of the training and feedback data
that are being fed into the algorithms. The lack of diversity in either
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
133. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 40, at 694–712 (discussing the distinction
between disparate treatment and disparate impact in the context of big data); Zarsky, supra note
40, at 1384–1404 (discussing disparate treatment and disparate impact in the context of socialscoring systems).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 97–99 (discussing the masking problem).
135. See discussion supra Section II.B (discussing algorithmic discrimination).
136. See discussion infra Sections III.C, III.D, III.E, III.F (proposing remedial actions
relating to ethics, transparency, accountability, and competition).
137. As Amy Webb, CEO of the Future Today Institute, declared:
The only way to address algorithmic discrimination in the future is to invest in
the present. The overwhelming majority of coders are white and male.
Corporations must do more than publish transparency reports about their staff—
they must actively invest in women and people of color, who will soon be the
next generation of workers. And when the day comes, they must choose new
hires both for their skills and their worldview. Universities must redouble their
efforts not only to recruit a diverse body of students—administrators and faculty
must support them through to graduation. And not just students. Universities
must diversify their faculties, to ensure that students see themselves reflected in
their teachers.
RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 23 (quoting Amy Webb, Chief Exec. Officer, Future Today
Inst.); see also MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS
MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD 154 (2018) (“Th[e] willful blindness on the part of some technology
creators is why we need inclusive technology . . . .”).
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direction will likely perpetuate the many historical biases that originate
in the offline world.
To respond to this need for inclusivity, commentators have called for
policies and practices to facilitate greater inclusion in the new
technological environment.138 For example, in its final report, the United
Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation
underscored the importance of developing “[a]n inclusive digital
economy and society.”139 Greater emphasis on inclusivity will help move
society closer to tackling the problems of both algorithmic discrimination
and algorithmic distortion.140
C. Ethics
As the previous Section noted, well-intentioned efforts can sometimes
lead to discriminatory outcomes. Efforts in an algorithmic society are no
different. As a result, policy makers and commentators should devote
greater time, effort, and energy to developing ethical standards that
should be built into the design, usage, and improvement of algorithms
and intelligent machines.141
To ensure the compliance of high ethical standards, responses should
be developed both inside and outside the design process. Within the
process, those involved in algorithmic design should devote greater
attention to developing best practices or codes of conduct concerning how
best to avoid or alleviate the problems of algorithmic discrimination and
distortion.142 Letting designers develop best practices and codes of
138. See Mark Warschauer, Reconceptualizing the Digital Divide, FIRST MONDAY (July
1, 2002), https://www.firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/967/888 [https://perma.cc/
QX69-E5WW] (“A framework of technology for social inclusion allows us to re-orient the focus
from that of gaps to be overcome by provision of equipment to that of social development to be
enhanced through the effective integration of ICT into communities and institutions.”).
139. High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 29–30.
140. See discussion supra Section II.C (discussing algorithmic distortion).
141. As the Obama Administration declared in its white paper on artificial intelligence:
Ethical training for AI practitioners and students is a necessary part of the
solution. Ideally, every student learning AI, computer science, or data science
would be exposed to curriculum and discussion on related ethics and security
topics. However, ethics alone is not sufficient. Ethics can help practitioners
understand their responsibilities to all stakeholders, but ethical training should
be augmented with technical tools and methods for putting good intentions into
practice by doing the technical work needed to prevent unacceptable outcomes.
COMM. ON TECH., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE 3 (2016) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE], https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future
_of_ai.pdf [https://perma.cc/24P5-FKYD].
142. See Katyal, supra note 2, at 108–11 (discussing codes of conduct for designing artificial
intelligence systems).
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conduct can be highly effective because they understand the
technological challenges and are in good positions to anticipate problems
that improperly designed algorithms and data practices could cause.
Thus far, there has been a growing push for the development of fair
and explainable algorithms.143 Pauline Kim explained the benefits of
“explainability” as follows:
When a model is interpretable, debate may ensue over
whether its use is justified, but it is at least possible to have
a conversation about whether relying on the behaviors or
attributes that drive the outcomes is normatively acceptable.
When a model is not interpretable, however, it is not even
possible to have the conversation.144
In January 2017, the U.S. Public Policy Council of the authoritative
Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) released its Statement on
Algorithmic Transparency and Accountability (ACM Statement).145
Principle 4 states explicitly that “[s]ystems and institutions that use
algorithmic decision-making are encouraged to produce explanations
regarding both the procedures followed by the algorithm and the specific
decisions that are made.”146 Later that year, the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) also released the second draft of its guiding
document entitled Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing
Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems.147 Included
in that document was a recommendation calling on software engineers to
“document all of their systems and related data flows, their performance,
limitations, and risks,” with emphases on “auditability, accessibility,
meaningfulness, and readability.”148 Apart from the ACM and the IEEE,
every year FAT/ML, which stands for “Fairness, Accountability, and
Transparency in Machine Learning,” “[brings] together a . . . community
of researchers and practitioners” with similar interests and concerns.149
Like the two other organizations, FAT/ML has adopted principles that
are designed to help make algorithms fair, explainable, ethical, and
transparent.150
143. See infra text accompanying notes 179–182.
144. Kim, supra note 40, at 922–23.
145. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1.
146. Id. at 2; see also Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Ensure that algorithmic decisions
as well as any data driving those decisions can be explained to end-users and other stakeholders
in non-technical terms.”).
147. INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14.
148. Id. at 68.
149. Fairness, Accountability, & Transparency in Machine Learning, FAT/ML,
https://www.fatml.org/ [https://perma.cc/2B24-PZ3G].
150. See Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (delineating principles laid down by the
FAT/ML).
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Even though trusting designers to come up with best practices and
codes of conduct can be highly promising, there also needs to be external
responses. At the domestic level, laws should be put in place to ensure
greater ethical standards in the design and use of algorithms. At the
international level, treaties,151 soft law recommendations,152 or other
normative documents can be utilized to help facilitate the development
of internationally acceptable standards. As consensus emerges at the
international level, these standards will slowly translate into domestic
laws and practices.

151. The area that has caught immediate attention concerns human rights. See INST. ELEC. &
ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 22–23 (proposing Principle 1 to ensure that autonomous and
intelligent systems “do not infringe upon human rights”); PEACOCK, supra note 18, at 108–84
(discussing the positive human rights obligations to facilitate access to the Internet and the
possibility of using human rights to provide support for the overall goal of bridging the digital
divide); Lorna McGregor et al., International Human Rights Law as a Framework for Algorithmic
Accountability, 68 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 309, 313 (2019) (“[A] human rights-based approach to
algorithmic accountability offers an organizing framework for the design, development and
deployment of algorithms . . . .”); Rohinton P. Medhora, AI & Global Governance: Three Paths
Towards a Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence, UNITED NATIONS U. CTR. POL’Y RES.
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://cpr.unu.edu/ai-global-governance-three-paths-towards-a-globalgovernance-of-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.cc/5TBZ-ZP4A] (“[A]lgorithms should
be subordinated to the same kind of universal ethics regime that governs human and state
behavior: something similar to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”). As Lorna
McGregor, Daragh Murray, and Vivian Ng elaborated:
First, [international human rights law] may rule out the use of algorithms in
certain decision-making processes. Second, it may require modifications or the
building in of additional safeguards in order to ensure rights compliance and thus
may create a delay in deployment. Third, it may shift debates on the
unpredictability of algorithms, particularly in the future where greater autonomy
is anticipated, from a perceived reduced responsibility to a greater responsibility
for actors that deploy algorithms in the knowledge that they cannot predict
effects, including to human rights. While these three findings act as restrictions
on the use of algorithms, in our view, they constitute appropriate checks and
balances. They are not intended to be “anti-innovation”. Instead algorithmic
decision-making is addressed in the same way as human decision-making. The
objective is to ensure that algorithms contribute to society, while safeguarding
against risks.
McGregor et al., supra, at 314–15.
152. Target 9.C of U.N. Sustainable Development Goal 9 provides: “Significantly increase
access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and
affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.” G.A. Res. 70/1,
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, at 21 (Oct. 21, 2015).
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D. Transparency
Commentators have noted how algorithms have resulted in the
creation of an inscrutable “black box.”153 In response to this problem,
Frank Pasquale outlined various legal strategies to provide checks against
some of the worst “black box” abuses while “mak[ing] the case for a new
politics and economics of reputation, search, and finance, based on the
ideal of an intelligible society.”154 Commentators have also noted the
importance of accountability by design.155 In the privacy area, for
instance, Woodrow Hartzog advanced “a design agenda for privacy law,”
explaining why “the design of popular technologies is critical to privacy,
and the law should take it more seriously.”156 In addition, commentators
have underscored the need for greater transparency in the design and use
of algorithms, including the disclosure of technological choices made by
algorithm designers.157 Some experts and organizations have also called

153. In his widely cited book, Frank Pasquale noted the dual meaning of the term “black
box”: “The term ‘black box’ . . . can refer to a recording device, like the data-monitoring systems
in planes, trains, and cars. Or it can mean a system whose workings are mysterious; we can
observe its inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.” PASQUALE, supra
note 86, at 3; see also DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at xvi (“When a new technology is as pervasive
and game changing as machine learning, it’s not wise to let it remain a black box.”); EUBANKS,
supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]hat’s the thing about being targeted by an algorithm: you get a sense of a
pattern in the digital noise, an electronic eye turned toward you, but you can’t put your finger on
exactly what’s amiss.”); RAINIE & ANDERSON, supra note 22, at 19 (“There is a larger problem
with the increase of algorithm-based outcomes beyond the risk of error or discrimination—the
increasing opacity of decision-making and the growing lack of human accountability.” (quoting
Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr.)).
154. PASQUALE, supra note 86, at 15; see also id. at 140–218 (outlining the legal strategies
to curb “black box” abuses and calling for the development of “an intelligible society”).
155. See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 640 (“[I]n order for a computer system to function
in an accountable way—either while operating an important civic process or merely engaging in
routine commerce—accountability must be part of the system’s design from the start.”).
156. HARTZOG, supra note 75, at 7.
157. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355
(calling for an open code model to improve the quality and legitimacy of decisions made by
administrative agencies); Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL
L. REV. 1183, 1250–79 (2019) (calling for the controlled disclosure of source code).
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on these designers to provide social impact statements158 or periodic
assessments.159
158. As the FAT/ML’s Principles for Accountable Algorithms and a Social Impact
Statement for Algorithms declare:
In order to ensure their adherence to these principles and to publicly commit
to associated best practices, we propose that algorithm creators develop a Social
Impact Statement using the above principles as a guiding structure. This
statement should be revisited and reassessed (at least) three times during the
design and development process:
•

design stage,

•

pre-launch,

•

and post-launch.

When the system is launched, the statement should be made public as a form
of transparency so that the public has expectations for social impact of the
system.
Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98; see also Katyal, supra note 2, at 111–17 (discussing human
impact statements in the artificial intelligence context); Selbst, supra note 40, 169–82 (advancing
a regulatory proposal based on the requirement of algorithmic impact statements); Selbst &
Barocas, supra note 112, at 1134–35 (discussing algorithmic impact statements).
159. Article 35(1) of the EU General Data Protection Regulation provides:
Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking
into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller
shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the
envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data.
Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, art. 35(1); see also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS,
supra note 14, at 98 (“A system to assess privacy impacts related to [autonomous and intelligent
systems] needs to be developed, along with best practice recommendations, especially as
automated decision systems spread into industries that are not traditionally data-rich.”); McGregor
et al., supra note 151, at 330 (discussing impact assessments in an algorithmic context);
Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (calling for assessment “(at least) three times during the design
and development process: design stage, pre-launch, and post-launch”). As Lorna McGregor,
Daragh Murray, and Vivian Ng explained:
During the design and development stage, impact assessments should evaluate
how an algorithm is likely to work, ensure that it functions as intended and
identify any problematic processes or assumptions. This provides an opportunity
to modify the design of an algorithm at an early stage, to build in human rights
compliance—including monitoring mechanisms—from the outset, or to halt
development if human rights concerns cannot be addressed. Impact assessments
should also be conducted at the deployment stage, in order to monitor effects
during operation. . . . [T]his requires that, during design and development, the
focus should not only be on testing but steps should also be taken to build in
effective oversight and monitoring processes that will be able to identify and
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While improving transparency in algorithmic design is of paramount
importance, algorithmic transparency alone does not suffice. As Anupam
Chander rightly noted, in the age of artificial intelligence, data used in,
and outcomes generated by, the algorithms should also be transparent.160
The importance of data transparency is obvious, considering that the
training and feedback data fed into the algorithms are key ingredients
sustaining the algorithmic operation. Even if the algorithms used are
properly designed, the inclusion of problematic data could heavily skew
the algorithmic outcomes.161
Indeed, in this age of artificial intelligence, scrutinizing algorithms
alone may not reveal the full extent of a problem.162 As Kartik Hosanagar
and Vivian Jair observed:
[M]achine learning algorithms—and deep learning
algorithms in particular—are usually built on just a few
hundred lines of code. The algorithms logic is mostly learned
from training data and is rarely reflected in its source code.
Which is to say, some of today’s best-performing algorithms
are often the most opaque.163
respond to human rights violations once the algorithm is deployed. This ability
to respond to violations is key as [international human rights law] requires that
problematic processes must be capable of being reconsidered, revised or
adjusted.
McGregor et al., supra note 151, at 330.
160. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1024–25 (“What we need instead is a transparency of
inputs and results, which allows us to see that the algorithm is generating discriminatory
impact.”); see also O’NEIL, supra note 87, at 229 (“We have to learn to interrogate our data
collection process, not just our algorithms.”).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 101–104 (discussing the biases and errors created
by problematic data).
162. See Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 641 (“[W]ithout full transparency—including source
code, input data, and the full operating environment of the software—even the disclosure of audit
logs showing what a program did while it was running provides no guarantee that the disclosed
information actually reflects a computer system’s behavior.”); see also id. at 657–60 (discussing
the limits to transparency in the algorithmic context).
163. Kartik Hosanagar & Vivian Jair, We Need Transparency in Algorithms, but Too Much
Can Backfire, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 23, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/we-need-transparencyin-algorithms-but-too-much-can-backfire [https://perma.cc/3NVS-FNWP]; see also Daniel
Gervais, Exploring the Interfaces Between Big Data and Intellectual Property Law, 10 J. INTELL.
PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 3, 5 (2019) (“[A]ny human contribution to the output
of deep learning systems is ‘second degree.’”). As a government report on artificial intelligence
explained:
Deep learning uses structures loosely inspired by the human brain, consisting of
a set of units (or “neurons”). Each unit combines a set of input values to produce
an output value, which in turn is passed on to other neurons downstream. For
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Thus, in cases involving self-learning algorithms, closely scrutinizing the
algorithms alone will unlikely provide the information needed to fully
understand the algorithmic operations.164 Such scrutiny will be even less
useful when algorithms begin designing new algorithms.165 In those
scenarios, the related designers’ ability to explain the algorithms involved
and the related technological choices will be much more limited than their
ability to explain the choices involved in the original algorithmic designs.
Like data transparency, the transparency of algorithmic outcomes is
also very important. Without knowing the outcomes, it will be difficult
for individual users or outside reviewers to determine the satisfactoriness
of the algorithms involved. The lack of outcome transparency also harms
users by reducing their ability to choose away from undesirable products
and services.166 Such a lack will also make it difficult for policy makers,
consumer advocates, and the public at large to document the problems in

example, in an image recognition application, a first layer of units might combine
the raw data of the image to recognize simple patterns in the image; a second
layer of units might combine the results of the first layer to recognize patternsof-patterns; a third layer might combine the results of the second layer; and so
on.
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 141, at 9. For discussions of deep learning, see generally
ALPAYDIN, supra note 111, at 104–09; KELLEHER, supra note 35; JOHN D. KELLEHER & BRENDAN
TIERNEY, DATA SCIENCE 121–30 (2018); THIERRY POIBEAU, MACHINE TRANSLATION 181–95
(2017).
164. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì observed:
Deep learning machines can self-reprogram to the point that even their
programmers are unable to understand the internal logic behind AI decisions. In
this context, it is difficult to detect hidden biases and to ascertain whether they
are caused by a fault in the computer algorithm or by flawed datasets.
Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 5; see also Chander, supra note 96, at 1040 (“[I]n the era of
self-enhancing algorithms, the algorithm’s human designers may not fully understand their own
creation: even Google engineers may no longer understand what some of their algorithms do.”).
Likewise, Joshua Kroll and his collaborators explained:
Machine learning . . . is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis because it
involves situations where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from
the specific data under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain.
In this case, source code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the code only
exposes the machine learning method used and not the data-driven decision rule.
Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 638 (footnote omitted).
165. See DOMINGOS, supra note 2, at 6 (“Learning algorithms—also known as learners—are
algorithms that make other algorithms. With machine learning, computers write their own
programs, so we don’t have to.”).
166. See Chander, supra note 96, at 1025 (“If we know that the results of an algorithm are
systematically discriminatory, then we know enough to seek to . . . distrust its results.”).
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the questionable products and services as well as for technology
developers to come up with improvements.167
To be sure, it can be cost-prohibitive to collect or disclose all
algorithmic outcomes, not to mention the lack of incentives for
technology developers to reveal the algorithms used or to make
algorithmic outcomes available for public scrutiny.168 While intellectual
property laws call into question the acceptability of demands to reveal
source codes used to develop algorithms, privacy laws caution against the
release of all algorithmic outcomes to the public.169
As a compromise, technology developers could provide a
representative, anonymized sample of the different algorithmic outcomes
to enable the public to determine for itself the satisfactoriness of
algorithm-enhanced technological products and services.170 This sample
could be made available to the public or be provided to external
auditors,171 ombudspersons,172 or oversight bodies.173 If privacy concerns
167. See id. (“If we know that the results of an algorithm are systematically discriminatory,
then we know enough to seek to redesign the algorithm . . . .”).
168. See Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 6 (“Commercial providers could be reluctant to
share information on their models or have their systems openly compared to their competitors.”).
169. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 5) (“[C]oncerns over privacy,
protecting trade secrets, or revelation of analytics that might allow malicious actors to game the
system can justify restricting access to qualified and authorized individuals.”); Pauline T. Kim,
Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191–92 (2017),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1212&context=penn_law_review
_online [https://perma.cc/4A9B-B2MC] (“[T]ransparency is often in tension with other important
interests, such as protecting trade secrets, ensuring the privacy of sensitive personal information,
and preventing strategic gaming of automated decision systems.”).
170. As Frank Pasquale declared:
Just as the “fair use” doctrine has deterred the overpropertization of expression,
generally recognized fair information practices should include large and
powerful data holders’ obligation to surrender some sample of their data to
entities entrusted to audit and assess the data holders’ activities. Objective audits
will help restore confidence in automated authority.
Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 235, 238–39 (2011) (footnote omitted).
171. See infra text accompanying notes 191–195 (discussing algorithmic audits and the need
for institutional oversight).
172. See McGregor et al., supra note 151, at 332 (“Independent oversight bodies established
to monitor State surveillance activity and analysis of their effectiveness may . . . provide points
of reference and comparison. Other models being proposed include dedicated ombuds for the AI
sector or the expansion of the mandate of existing ombuds to address these issues as well as
industry regulatory bodies.” (footnote omitted)).
173. See INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, supra note 14, at 70 (“An independent, internationally
coordinated body should be formed to oversee whether [autonomous and intelligent systems]
actually meet ethical criteria, both when deployed, and considering their evolution after
deployment and interaction with other products.”); Pasquale, supra note 170, at 247 (“[P]erhaps
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are significant, these developers could instead offer algorithmic outcomes
based on test data provided by consumer advocacy groups. The provision
of these samples is important because they would support external audits
even without providing access to the algorithms involved.174
In recent years, commentators have also paid greater attention to the
so-called right to explanation, especially when it relates to the new
European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation.175 Although
this right can be traced back to the 1995 EU Data Protection Directive,176
a trusted advisory committee within the Federal Trade Commission could help courts and agencies
adjudicate coming controversies over search engine practices.”); see also Katyal, supra note 157,
at 1250–79 (calling for the controlled disclosure of source code); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty,
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343,
1419–20 (2018) (discussing the disclosure of source code under protective orders in the criminal
setting). While disclosure to regulatory authorities makes great policy sense, governments
increasingly push for provisions in bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade agreements that ban
laws requiring the disclosure or transfer of software source code. See, e.g., Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement art. 14.17.1, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/2UHR-LSQ5] (“No Party
shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another
Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products
containing such software, in its territory.”). See also Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and
Data Flows in Trade Agreements: The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65,
115 (2017) (discussing this provision).
174. Rob Kitchin outlined six distinct ways to conduct research on algorithms: (1)
“[e]xamining pseudo-code [or] source code”; (2) “[r]eflexively producing code”; (3) “[r]everse
engineering”; (4) “[i]nterviewing designers or conducting an ethnography of a coding team”; (5)
“[u]npacking the full socio-technical assemblage of algorithms”; and (6) “[e]xamining how
algorithms do work in the world.” Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching
Algorithms, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 14, 22–26 (2017).
175. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, recital 71, at 14 (stating that the
automated processing of personal data “should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should
include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to
express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such
assessment and to challenge the decision”); id. art. 13.2(f), at 41 (requiring the data controller to
provide to the data subject information about “the existence of automated decision-making,
including profiling, . . . and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic
involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the
data subject”); id. art. 14.2(g), at 42 (requiring the same). For discussions of what commentators
have referred to as the right to explanation, see generally Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The
Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW:
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 77 (Tatiani-Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017); Lilian Edwards
& Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a “Right to an Explanation” Is Probably Not the
Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 (2017); Margot E. Kaminski, The
Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189 (2019); Andrew D. Selbst & Julia
Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 233
(2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision
Making and a “Right to Explanation,” AI MAG., Fall 2017, at 50.
176. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC) (“Member States

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss2/4

46

Yu and Yu: The Algorithmic Divide and Equality in the Age of Artificial Inte

2020]

THE ALGORITHMIC DIVIDE AND EQUALITY IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

377

which preceded the new regulation,177 commentators have now devoted
greater energy and effort to understanding this emerging right, due in
large part to the increasing need to explain how data are being collected
and used in technological platforms that are heavily driven by algorithms.
In this age of artificial intelligence, the right to explanation is
important not only because of the data used in the algorithms but also
because of the algorithmic designs. Considering the not-too-distant future
when algorithms will actively design new algorithms, building
explainability into algorithmic designs as part of best practices or codes
of conduct will likely be highly important.178 It is indeed no surprise that
some commentators have emphasized the need to develop explainable
algorithms, even though they acknowledge the continuous challenge of
fully explaining the design and operation of algorithms.179
For example, the U.S. Department of Defense has launched the
Explainable AI (XAI) program that “aims to create a suite of machine
learning techniques that [(1)] [p]roduce more explainable models, while
maintaining a high level of learning performance (prediction accuracy);
and [(2)] [e]nable human users to understand, appropriately trust, and
effectively manage the emerging generation of artificially intelligent
partners.”180 As a program manager at the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency Program explained:
shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller . . . knowledge of the
logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the
automated decisions . . . .”); id. art. 15.1, at 43 (“Member States shall grant the right to every
person not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly
affects him and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate certain
personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability,
conduct, etc.”).
177. See Edwards & Veale, supra note 175, at 20 (noting that a remedy similar to the right
to explanation “had existed in the EU Data Protection Directive . . . which preceded the [General
Data Protection Regulation], since 1995” (footnote omitted)).
178. See Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7 (“[U]nderstanding AI internal logic is a first
step towards ensuring full accountability for computational legal research and automated legal
decisions.”).
179. See ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1 (“Decisions made by predictive algorithms
can be opaque because . . . []the algorithm may not lend itself to easy explanation[] . . . .”);
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE, supra note 141, at 9 (“Because trained models have a very large
number of adjustable parameters—often hundreds of millions or more—training may yield a
model that ‘works,’ in the sense of matching the data, but is not necessarily the simplest model
that works.”); Noto La Diega, supra note 28, at 23 (suggesting that “a technical document which
includes the algorithm used and the mere explanation of the logic in mathematical terms will not
in itself meet the legal requirement [for the right to explanation]” and that this requirement “should
be interpreted as the disclosure of the algorithm with an explanation in non-technical terms of the
rationale of the decision and criteria relied upon”).
180. Matt Turek, Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS
AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/
8BPN-7N4K].
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New machine-learning systems will have the ability to
explain their rationale, characterize their strengths and
weaknesses, and convey an understanding of how they will
behave in the future. The strategy for achieving that goal is
to develop new or modified machine-learning techniques
that will produce more explainable models. These models
will be combined with state-of-the-art human-computer
interface techniques capable of translating models into
understandable and useful explanation dialogues for the end
user . . . .181
Likewise, private technology developers and research institutions
have engaged in efforts to train intelligent machines to document their
algorithms and internal logic. As Ronald Yu and Gabriele Spina Alì
recounted:
[A] team at Microsoft is trying to teach AI to show how it
weighted every single variable in evaluating mortality risk
factors. Similarly, a team at Rutgers University is working
on a deep neural network that provides users with examples
that demonstrates why it took a specific algorithmic
decision. Another project at the University of Berkeley
involves lashing two neural networks together, tasking one
to describe the inner procedures running inside the other.
Finally, an international team consisting, among the others,
of researchers from Facebook, Berkeley and the University
of Amsterdam has taught an image recognition software to
show the evidence he relied upon to reach its decisions.182
E. Accountability
As important as transparency is, it should not be equated with
accountability.183 As political processes have repeatedly demonstrated,
one could have a highly transparent process that involves checks and
balances, different rounds of open consultations, and a large number of
publicly available documents, yet the outcomes remain heavily captured
by industries and are of limited public accountability.184 To address the
181. Id.
182. Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
183. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in
Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 184 (2017) (“Normally, with human decisionmaking, oversight is principally achieved through transparency—so much so that the terms
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ are often used interchangeably. In the realm of algorithmic
enforcement, however, transparency alone is insufficient to generate accountability, for
algorithms—due to their inherent traits—lack critical reflection.”).
184. See generally MONICA HORTEN, A COPYRIGHT MASQUERADE: HOW CORPORATE
LOBBYING THREATENS ONLINE FREEDOMS (2013) (discussing how legislative capture by the
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problems that the emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide causes,
transparency-based solutions should be separated from accountabilitybased solutions.
As noted earlier, civil rights and antidiscrimination laws already exist
to ensure accountability.185 These laws will address the problems caused
by those who have designed algorithms intentionally to facilitate
individual deprivation or discrimination. Indeed, the need for public
accountability in the artificial intelligence context is not that different
from similar needs in other contexts, or in the offline world. Principle 3
of the ACM Statement expressly states that “[i]nstitutions should be held
responsible for decisions made by the algorithms that they use, even if it
is not feasible to explain in detail how the algorithms produce their
results.”186 That statement states further: “Policymakers should hold
institutions using analytics to the same standards as institutions where
humans have traditionally made decisions and developers should plan
and architect analytical systems to adhere to those standards when
algorithms are used to make automated decisions or as input to decisions
made by people.”187
In most situations, however, the discrimination or distortion originates
in neutral or well-intentioned efforts. As a result, accountability will have
to manifest in the form of remediation, rather than punishment. Such
remediation-based accountability will require technology developers to
quickly correct the problems once they have been notified of these
problems188—similar, perhaps, to the “notice and takedown”
copyright industries has undermined online freedom); BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN TELES, THE
CAPTURED ECONOMY: HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND
INCREASE INEQUALITY 64–89 (2017) (discussing capture in the intellectual property area).
185. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 166 (“Antidiscrimination laws typically
govern decisions on credit, housing, and employment, and restrict the use of categories such as
race, gender, disability, or age.”); supra text accompanying notes 131–132.
186. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 3); see INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS,
supra note 14, at 27 (proposing Principle 3 to “assure that designers, manufacturers, owners, and
operators of [autonomous and intelligent systems] are responsible and accountable”); see also id.
at 27–28 (providing recommendations under proposed Principle 3).
187. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
188. See id. at 2 (Principle 2) (“Regulators should encourage the adoption of mechanisms
that enable questioning and redress for individuals and groups that are adversely affected by
algorithmically informed decisions.”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Make available
externally visible avenues of redress for adverse individual or societal effects of an algorithmic
decision system, and designate an internal role for the person who is responsible for the timely
remedy of such issues.”); see also Chander, supra note 96, at 1025 (“[I]f we believe that the realworld facts, on which algorithms are trained and operate, are deeply suffused with invidious
discrimination, then our prescription to the problem of racist or sexist algorithms is algorithmic
affirmative action.” (footnote omitted)); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due
Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 126–
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arrangements now found in copyright law.189 Indeed, as technology
becomes increasingly complicated and inscrutable, ensuring quick
correction of the problem will likely be more constructive than punishing
those who have allowed the problems to surface in the first place, often
unintentionally.
It will also be important to provide institutional oversight of the design
and use of algorithms that have far-reaching political, social, economic,
and cultural impacts or that deeply affect the public interest.190 Such
oversight—and the enforcement power with which it comes—is
particularly urgent if problems have already been documented.
Finally, it will be useful to require regular algorithmic audits to hold
technology developers accountable.191 As Pauline Kim explained:
27 (2014) (“Once notice is available, the question then becomes how one might challenge the
fairness of the predictive process employed. We believe that the most robust mechanism for this
is the opportunity to be heard and, if necessary, correct the record.”).
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2018) (requiring online service providers to “respond[]
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity” once these providers have been notified of copyright
infringement or obtained knowledge or awareness of such infringement); see also Peter K. Yu,
Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693,
709–13 (2010) (providing an overview of the “notice and takedown” procedure in copyright law).
190. See TREASURY BD. OF CAN. SECRETARIAT, RESPONSIBLE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN
THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA 33 (2018) (Can.) (Version 2.0) (“[Potential] models of governance
that could provide the necessary oversight and guidance to Federal institutions . . . can range from
an ad hoc federal ‘Automation Advisory Board’ comprising of internal and external experts to a
more formal and permanent body with staff.”); Katyal, supra note 2, at 109 (noting the need for
“regulatory participation” to provide effective ethical safeguards); McGregor et al., supra note
151, at 330–31 (“The establishment of internal monitoring and oversight bodies can play an
important role in coordinating and overseeing the implementation of regular impact assessments
and ensuring that findings are addressed.”); Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of
Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA.
L. REV. ONLINE 57, 66 (2019), http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/virginialawreview.org/
files/04.%20Final%20Ringrose.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CTV-Q2Z4] (underscoring the need to
“establish independent oversight ensuring police accountability and mitigation of facialrecognition misidentification errors likely to have a racially disparate impact”).
191. As the Center for Democracy and Technology noted on its website:
Audits are one method to provide explanations and redress without
compromising the intellectual property behind the business model. Designing
algorithmic systems that can be easily audited increases accountability and
provides a framework to standardize best practices across industries. While
explanations can help individuals understand algorithmic decision making,
audits are necessary for systemic and long-term detection of unfair outcomes.
They also make it possible to fix problems when they arise.
Digital Decisions, supra note 46; see also Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A
Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37–42 (2017) (discussing ways to
test and evaluate algorithms). But see Kroll et al., supra note 95, at 660–61 (discussing the limits
to auditing in the algorithmic context).
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When the goal is nondiscrimination, auditing could involve
techniques to ensure that an algorithm follows a specified
rule—for example, sorting must not occur based on race or
sex. Alternatively, auditing for discrimination could take the
form of examining inputs and outputs to detect when a
decision process systematically disadvantages particular
groups. The latter form of auditing does not involve direct
examination of the decision process, but is useful in
detecting patterns.192
Principle 6 of the ACM Statement specifically requires that “[m]odels,
algorithms, data, and decisions be recorded so that they can be audited in
cases where harm is suspected.”193 Principle 7 further states: “Institutions
should use rigorous methods to validate their models and document those
methods and results. In particular, they should routinely perform tests to
assess and determine whether the model generates discriminatory harm.
Institutions are encouraged to make the results of such tests public.”194
Although algorithmic audits can be done internally, it is often
important for government regulators, ombudspersons, or outside auditors
to independently review the algorithms and data used.195 Indeed, past
experience has shown that outsiders are sufficiently motivated and well
equipped196 to find bugs and other vulnerabilities in computer programs

192. Kim, supra note 169, at 190.
193. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 6); see also INST. ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS,
supra note 14, at 53 (“To maximize effective evaluation by third parties (e.g., regulators, accident
investigators), [autonomous and intelligent systems] should be designed, specified, and
documented so as to permit the use of strong verification and validation techniques for assessing
the system’s safety and norm compliance . . . .”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98 (“Identify,
log, and articulate sources of error and uncertainty throughout the algorithm and its data sources
so that expected and worst case implications can be understood and inform mitigation
procedures.”); Digital Decisions, supra note 46 (“An effective audit requires institutions to
maintain internal documentation of the logic or circumstance behind significant design choices
and procedures governing who is responsible for making changes. These systems are best installed
as a product develops, rather than retroactively.”).
194. ACM STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 (Principle 7).
195. See id. (Principle 5) (“Public scrutiny of the data provides maximum opportunity for
corrections.”); Diakopoulos et al., supra note 98, at 2 (“Enable interested third parties to probe,
understand, and review the behavior of the algorithm through disclosure of information that
enables monitoring, checking, or criticism, including through provision of detailed
documentation, technically suitable [application programming interfaces], and permissive terms
of use.”); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 180–82 (discussing the
need for external and internal algorithmists); Annie Lee, Note, Algorithmic Auditing and
Competition Under the CFAA: The Revocation Paradigm of Interpreting Access and
Authorization, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1307, 1309–10 (2018) (“Algorithmic auditors largely
consist of academics, computer scientists from nonprofits, and journalists who scrutinize online
websites powered by algorithms for bias and discrimination.” (footnotes omitted)).
196. Some users will no doubt discover these bugs and vulnerabilities by accident.
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or systems.197 To provide support for external audits that do not involve
regulatory authorities, adjustments will have to be made to those laws that
have posed barriers to external reviews of source code and computer
systems,198 such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act199 and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.200
F. Competition
Competition is imperative if society is to develop more efficient, more
effective, and less biased algorithms.201 Such competition is particularly
needed when algorithmic choices are increasingly difficult, or time
197. See Peter K. Yu, Anticircumvention and Anti-anticircumvention, 84 DENV. U. L. REV.
13, 24 (2006) (discussing SunnComm’s threat to sue a computer science graduate student who
figured out on his own how to disarm its copy-protection technology by pushing the shift key
when loading a CD into a computer); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (involving a Norwegian teenager who cowrote the DeCSS
program that circumvented the copy-protection technology used by the U.S. motion picture
industry), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
198. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2018)),
for example, provides a limited exception for encryption research. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g). This
exception, however, has been criticized for failing to support such research. See Joseph P. Liu,
The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 501, 503 (2003)
(“[E]ven though academic encryption researchers can continue to conduct and publish some of
their research under the DMCA without significant practical risk of criminal or civil liability, the
DMCA significantly affects the manner in which that research is conducted.”); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 524 (1999) (arguing that the
DMCA “should be amended to provide a general purpose ‘or other legitimate purposes’ provision
to avert judicial contortions in interpreting the statute”); Peter K. Yu, Is Anti-Piracy Law Stifling
Cybersecurity Innovation?, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 20 (discussing how the DMCA has
undermined cryptography and cybersecurity).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018). As Sonia Katyal observed:
[T]he ACLU sued on behalf of four researchers who maintained that [this statute]
actually prevented them from scraping data from sites, or from creating fake
profiles to investigate whether algorithmic discrimination led some employment
and real estate sites to fail to display certain listings on the basis of race or gender.
The concern was that the law permitted researchers to be held criminally
accountable because the research might involve violating one of the sites’ Terms
of Service, something that could carry both prison and fines. As one researcher
observed, these laws have the perverse effect of “protecting data-driven
commercial systems from even the most basic external analysis.”
Katyal, supra note 2, at 122 (footnotes omitted); see also Lee, supra note 195, at 1311–38
(discussing how the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has discouraged algorithmic auditors from
exposing questionable business practices and has fostered a hostile market for legitimate
competitors).
200. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
201. See Lee, supra note 195, at 1310 (“Online competitors . . . promote fair online practices
by providing users with a choice between competitive products . . . .”).
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consuming, to explain.202 Indeed, without competition, it would be hard
to identify problems within an algorithm or to determine whether that
algorithm has provided the best solution in light of the existing
technological conditions and constraints. Moreover, because a wide
variety of algorithms exist to achieve the same goal, competition will be
greatly needed to accommodate the different trade-offs preferred by
either algorithm designers or consumers.203
In the past decade, commentators have already explained why
competition is badly needed in a data-pervasive world, the Internet of
Things, and the Fourth Industrial Revolution.204 In the artificial
intelligence context, for instance, commentators have examined the
challenge of using antitrust or competition law to foster competition
among the dominant players.205 In the past few years, European
competition authorities have also actively explored ways to address the
202. See supra text accompanying notes 162–165 (noting the growing challenges to
explaining algorithms in the artificial intelligence context).
203. See AGRAWAL ET AL., supra note 103, at 189 (“There is often no single right answer to
the question of which is the best AI strategy or the best set of AI tools, because AIs involve tradeoffs: more speed, less accuracy; more autonomy, less control; more data, less privacy.”).
204. As Timo Minssen and Justin Pierce observed:
While there are issues to be resolved between Big Data and [intellectual
property rights], there is a growing awareness of the importance of data and
specifically Big Data by market authorities. Antitrust agencies, those in the
United States and competition agencies in Europe, are taking note of Big Data,
and there is an increasing trend to examine closely the collection, use, and access
of Big Data for anticompetitive effects.
Timo Minssen & Justin Pierce, Big Data and Intellectual Property Rights in the Health and Life
Sciences, in BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 311, 320 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2018);
see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 182–84 (discussing the use of
competition law to govern the data barons); Josef Drexl, Designing Competitive Markets for
Industrial Data—Between Propertisation and Access, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. &
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 257, 280–85 (2017) (discussing the application of EU competition law to
address refusals to grant access to data); Peter K. Yu, Data Producer’s Right and the Protection
of Machine-Generated Data, 93 TUL. L. REV. 859, 927 (2019) (noting that competition law is “a
critical area relating to data governance”).
205. See generally Rupprecht Podszun & Stefan Kreifels, Data and Competition Law, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN DATA SCIENCE AND LAW 183 (Vanessa Mak et al. eds., 2018) (discussing
the uneasy relationship between data and competition law); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi,
Antitrust, Algorithmic Pricing and Tacit Collusion, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, supra note 40, at 624, 628–32 (discussing the complications regarding
algorithmic tacit collusion); Clark D. Asay, Artificial Stupidity, 61 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 51–53), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3399170 [https://perma.cc
/F7TR-Y4N6] (discussing the pros and cons of using antitrust to thwart consolidation in the
artificial intelligence industry); Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Dataopolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275 (2018) (discussing “data-opolies” in the antitrust context and
the harm they cause).
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anticompetitive effects generated by U.S. technology giants, such as
Google and Facebook.206
The issues relating to competition are complicated because big-data
analytics require the existence of large, comprehensive datasets.207 The
more competition there is, the more fragmentary datasets will become,
and the less likely that the full potential of artificial intelligence will be
realized. Nevertheless, policy makers and commentators have
increasingly looked for laws, policies, and institutional mechanisms to
facilitate data sharing, portability, and interoperability.208 After all, the
better coordinated the data usage is, the more benefits algorithmic
competition will provide. Greater competition in this area will also make
it easier to identify problems in algorithms, especially those utilizing
identical or substantially identical training and feedback data.209

206. See Stucke, supra note 205, at 275–77 (discussing the actions taken by the European
competition authorities against Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon); see also Peter K. Yu &
John Cross, Why Are the Europeans Going After Google?, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2015, 2:31 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/why-are-europeans-going-after-google-332775 [https://perma.cc/
MB8M-8m69] (discussing the EU antitrust probe of Google).
207. See MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 30 (“[B]ig data relies on all the
information, or at least as much as possible . . . .”).
208. See Council Regulation 2016/679, supra note 109, art. 20, at 45 (introducing the right
to data portability); see also MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 75, at 183 (“We should
enable data transactions, such as through licensing and interoperability.”); Drexl, supra note 204,
at 292 (“The functioning of the data economy will also depend on the interoperability of digital
formats and the tools of data collecting and processing.”); Wolfgang Kerber, A New (Intellectual)
Property Right for Non-Personal Data? An Economic Analysis, 65 GEWERBLICHER
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR INT] 989, 997 (2016) (Ger.)
(“[S]upporting portability, interoperability and standardization in regard to data is seen as pivotal
policy measures for improving the governance of data in the digital economy.”); Yu, supra note
204, at 889 (“[I]f we are to maximize our ability to undertake big data analyses, such analyses
may require greater sharing of data—which, in turn, calls for greater data portability and
interoperability.”).
209. As Professor Kitchin suggested:
[R]esearchers might search Google using the same terms on multiple computers
in multiple jurisdictions to get a sense of how its PageRank algorithm is
constructed and works in practice, or they might experiment with posting and
interacting with posts on Facebook to try and determine how its EdgeRank
algorithm positions and prioritises posts in user time lines, or they might use
proxy servers and feed dummy user profiles into e-commerce systems to see how
prices might vary across users and locales.
Kitchin, supra note 174, at 24 (citations omitted); see also Yu & Spina Alì, supra note 105, at 7
(calling on legal researchers to “compare outputs from different programs to detect flaws in the
AI utilized and increase research accuracy”).
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G. Perspective
If society is to truly understand how the remedial actions proposed in
this Article can properly address the emerging and ever-widening
algorithmic divide, it needs to have realistic goals. As appealing as it is
to foster equality in the age of artificial intelligence, society should
recognize that such equality takes time to achieve, if achievable at all.
Indeed, much of the inequality perpetuated by algorithms and intelligent
machines may be historical and may therefore have limited relation to
algorithmic designs and data practices. If so, the solution to the problem
lies elsewhere.
Two decades ago, when policy makers were actively searching for
ways to bridge the digital divide, commentators reminded us of the
importance of focusing on relative, as opposed to absolute, inequality in
the information society.210 In her widely cited book on the digital divide,
Pippa Norris observed:
Despite the more exaggerated hopes of some cyberoptimists, the Internet is not going to suddenly eradicate the
fundamental and intractable problems of disease, debt, and
disadvantage facing developing countries. The more
interesting question, with important implications for
understanding the new media, concerns the relative
inequality of opportunities. Is it easier or more difficult to go
online in different societies, compared with inequalities of
access to other types of communication technologies, such
as telephones and televisions?211
Considering that the real world is far from equal, inequality will always
find its way to the technological environment. Having a more realistic
perspective will certainly be conducive to developing workable solutions
to help bridge the algorithmic divide.
After all, the extent of this divide may have been influenced by the
existence of other divides, such as those relating to disparities in power,
wealth, or education.212 As Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky rightly
210. See NORRIS, supra note 13, at 49–54 (discussing relative inequalities in the information
society); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 4 (“[One] misunderstanding might be the impression that the
[digital] divide is about absolute inequalities, such as between those included and those excluded.
In reality, most inequalities of access to digital technology are of a more relative kind.”); Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 164 (“[T]o avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater, critics
should compare the consequences of algorithmic decisions to the prevailing status quo.”).
211. NORRIS, supra note 13, at 49.
212. See High-level Panel Report, supra note 32, at 6 (“Many existing inequalities—in
wealth, opportunity, education, and health—are being widened further [by the digital divide].”);
INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 6, at v (“AI may widen gaps between countries, reinforcing
the current digital divide. Countries may need different strategies and responses because AI
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observed, “In many cases, criticisms of algorithmic decisions in fact
reflect broader concerns about a digital divide or even a general
condemnation of an unequal society.”213 One of the authors’ illustrations
concerns the Boston-based Street Bump app, which uses Global
Positioning System coordinates and motion-sensing capabilities in
smartphones to automatically report potholes to municipal authorities.214
While innovative and socially beneficial, that app has been criticized for
reporting more potholes in wealthy neighborhoods than poorer areas, due
in large part to the higher concentration of smartphone usage in the
reported neighborhoods.215 Anticipating these and other similar
complications, well-meaning governmental authorities frequently
struggle with the difficult dilemma concerning whether to introduce new
technological solutions that would address urban problems but at the
adoption levels vary.” (footnote omitted)); VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 6 (“[Digital d]ivides are
byproducts of old inequalities, digital technology is intensifying inequalities, and new inequalities
are appearing.”); see also Kate Crawford & Ryan Calo, There Is a Blind Spot in AI Research,
NATURE (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/there-is-a-blind-spot-in-ai-research1.20805 [https://perma.cc/MGQ4-H2MQ] (“[I]n some current contexts, the downsides of AI
systems disproportionately affect groups that are already disadvantaged by factors such as race,
gender and socio-economic background.”). The converse is also true: bridging the digital divide
could help cabin or reduce other divides. See Yu, supra note 7, at 35 (“[S]olutions to the digital
divide and other, more traditional divides can work together to reinforce each other.”).
213. Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 90, at 137.
214. As the authors described:
In 2013, Boston adopted an innovative solution to combat the common
municipal problem of road potholes. The city introduced “Street Bump,” an app
using the motion-sensing capabilities of smartphones to automatically report
information to [the] municipal government about the condition of the streets
users drive on. When a user’s car hit a pothole, their phone recorded the shock
and sent it to a data hub, which combined the information from many other
phones to pinpoint problem areas on streets to be repaired.
Id. at 158.
215. As the authors explained:
Despite being presented as evidence for the risks of algorithmic decisionmaking, the Boston Street Bump app had little to do with data-driven
discrimination. If the app were programmed to apportion greater weight to
reports coming from wealthier neighborhoods than poorer ones, for example,
critics could rightly blame it for class-based discrimination. But that was not the
case with Street Bump, which simply created a seamless way to report and help
fix a common urban flaw. In this case, where a higher density of smartphone
users in wealthier neighborhoods created the concentration of reports, critics
were not really faulting the app but rather the city’s socio-economic fabric. Like
many large American cities, Boston has racial, ethnic, and socio-economic fault
lines, which transcend ownership and use of smartphones and apps.
Id. at 159.
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same time perpetuate existing inequities. Reflecting on this dilemma, the
authors asked:
Should cities avoid deploying new apps just because they
help part, but not all, of their population? And against which
backdrop should municipal leaders assess Street Bump’s
disparate impact? Perhaps the previous pothole reporting
system—mailing complaints through the post or calling
them in on the phone—was unbalanced as well? More
generally, in an unequal society, every time an institution
acts to improve a system, improving life for some citizens, it
can be criticized for increasing—or at least not
diminishing—existing disparities with persons who are
worse off. Does that imply that until all disparities are
purged urban systems should not improve?216
These questions are important, because the overarching goal of efforts to
bridge the algorithmic divide is not to close the divide—an arguably
impossible feat—but to expand access to machine learning and artificial
intelligence to those who would otherwise be disenfranchised.217
Finally, as rhetorically attractive as the term “algorithmic divide” may
have been, one should recall the fact that emphasizing a binary divide
often blurs the distinction between the different levels of algorithmic
inclusion based on age, gender, ethnicity, income, education, geography,
and many other variables. To some extent, the term “algorithmic divide”
faces the same problem as the term “digital divide,” which implies “a
bipolar societal split.”218 As Mark Warschauer observed with respect to
the latter:
[T]here is not a binary division between information haves
and have-nots, but rather a gradation based on different
degrees of access to information technology. Compare, for
example, a professor at UCLA with a high-speed connection
in her office, a student in Seoul who occasionally uses a
cyber cafè, and a rural activist in Indonesia who has no
computer or phone line but whose colleagues in the
nongovernmental organization . . . with whom she is
216. Id.
217. Cf. WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 211 (“The overall policy challenge is not to
overcome a digital divide but rather to expand access to and use of ICT for promoting social
inclusion.”).
218. Id. at 6; see also RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 55 (“[T]he digital divide indicates not a
gap in terms of a binary division, but rather a continuum based on different degrees of possession
and level of use of technologies of information.”); VAN DIJK, supra note 16, at 3 (“If any
delineation is required, a tripartite society might be a better definition than a two-tiered one. At
one extreme we perceive an information elite and at the other the digitally illiterate or the fully
excluded. In between are the majority of the population, having access in one way or another and
using digital technology to a certain extent.” (citation omitted)).
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working download and print out information for her. This
example illustrates just three degrees of possible access a
person can have to online material.219
Likewise, Henry Jenkins declared: “The rhetoric of the digital divide
holds open this division between civilized tool-users and uncivilized
nonusers. As well-meaning as it is as a policy initiative, it can be
marginalizing and patronizing in its own terms.”220
To make things even more complicated, an individual can be on one
side of the digital divide based on select categories but on the other side
based on other categories. As Jan van Dijk observed:
Take, for instance, a relatively poor, young, single, female,
Jamaican teacher living in the United Kingdom. Her
inclusion in the categories of educational workers, young
people, and inhabitants of a developed country would put her
on the “right” side of the digital divide . . . . However, being
a female with relatively low income, perhaps living alone
without a partner or children to share a computer or Internet
connection, and being part of an ethnic minority means that
she would most likely be on the “wrong” side of the
divide.221
In sum, society needs to keep its perspective in check when
developing solutions to bridge the algorithmic divide. Like the digital
divide, the algorithmic divide has many dimensions and covers many
different areas. Neither an emphasis on absolute equality nor a focus on
the binary split will help society develop the laws, policies, and
institutional mechanisms needed to address such a critical challenge in
the age of artificial intelligence.
CONCLUSION
The emerging and ever-widening algorithmic divide has threatened to
take away the many political, economic, social, cultural, educational, and
career opportunities that machine learning and artificial intelligence have
provided to a large segment of the population—whether national or
global. While this divide is only at the emerging stage, it is quickly
widening,222 just like how the digital divide started two decades ago with
219. WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 6–7.
220. Jeffrey R. Young, Does “Digital Divide” Rhetoric Do More Harm than Good?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Does-Digital-Divide-Rhetoric/
3058 [https://perma.cc/9X67-ZCQ9], cited in WARSCHAUER, supra note 18, at 7.
221. VAN DIJK, supra note 13, at 13.
222. To make tracking the algorithmic divide more difficult, algorithms evolve over time.
See Kitchin, supra note 174, at 16 (“What constitutes an algorithm has changed over time and
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a focus on the lack of access to information technology before quickly
expanding to encompass the lack of access to digital content and skills.223
This Article takes stock of this algorithmic divide and the three
problems that the divide has precipitated: algorithmic deprivation,
algorithmic discrimination, and algorithmic distortion. To fashion a
holistic response to these problems, the Article utilizes a
multidisciplinary approach and proposes seven clusters of remedial
actions. While these actions are by no means exhaustive, they provide
useful starting points for policy makers and commentators to start
thinking about how laws, policies, institutions, and business practices can
be harnessed to bridge the algorithmic divide. By proposing these actions,
this Article aims to foster greater equality in the age of artificial
intelligence.

they can be thought about in a number of ways: technically, computationally, mathematically,
politically, culturally, economically, contextually, materially, philosophically, ethically and so
on.”).
223. See RAGNEDDA, supra note 18, at 4–5 (discussing the evolution of the three levels of
the digital divide); Yu, supra note 7, at 29–32 (noting the ever-changing definition of the digital
divide); see also Mira Burri, Re-Conceptualizing the Global Digital Divide, 2 J. INTELL. PROP.
INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 217, 219–21 (2011) (discussing the digital divide as impeded
access to content).
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